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Abstract
Some securities fraud plaintiffs contend that greed—in the form of
perpetuating a prestigious executive position, ensuring a gainful bonus, or
maintaining the appearance of corporate profitability—is a bona fide
motive evidencing scienter. But currently, no single judicial standard or
analytical rubric guides the analysis of whether allegations of greed
indicate scienter in these cases. The Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act of 1995 (PSLRA) requires that the complaint state “with particularity”
facts giving rise to a “strong inference” that the defendant acted with the
scienter required for the cause of action. Plaintiffs have long established
scienter through “motive and opportunity” pleading: facts demonstrating
the presence of a motive in tandem with the perpetrator’s opportunity to
commit the fraud. As part of motive and opportunity pleading, some
plaintiffs have contended that greed can be a manifestation of scienter.
Such allegations have met disparate and somewhat unreasoned fates.
This Article draws from the over one hundred reported circuit court
cases interpreting the “strong inference” standard in a variety of factual
settings to propose a framework for more orderly analysis of allegations
of corporate and personal avarice. Guided by the way some courts analyze
the role of insider stock transactions in scienter pleading, the contextual
model identifies three dimensions—magnitude, timing, and
atypicality—that can heighten ordinary profit-seeking activities to
suspicious or unusual conduct and can provide a motive that properly
gives rise to a strong inference of scienter.
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“The point is, ladies and gentlemen, that greed—for lack of a better
word—is good. Greed is right. Greed works. Greed clarifies, cuts through,
and captures the essence of the evolutionary spirit. Greed, in all of its
forms—greed for life, for money, for love, knowledge—has marked the
upward surge of mankind. And greed—you mark my words—will not only
save Teldar Paper, but that other malfunctioning corporation called the
USA.” Gordon Gekko, Wall Street1
“[Greed] is a sin directly against one’s neighbor, since one man cannot
over-abound in external riches, without another man lacking them . . . .”
Saint Thomas Aquinas2

1. WALL STREET (20th Century Fox 1987).
2. SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE: A CONCISE TRANSLATION 118 (Timothy
McDermott ed. 1989).
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I. INTRODUCTION
Greed is “a normal desire that combines eagerness, curiosity,
competitiveness, and a need for security, accusation, and protection.”3 One
of the Bible’s Seven Deadly Sins, greed is also defined as an “excessive
desire to acquire or possess more (especially more material wealth) than
one needs or deserves” or as “reprehensible acquisitiveness; insatiable
desire for wealth.”4 According to behavioral scientists, while simple greed
is normal, uncontrolled greed can become pathologic and sociopathic
when it exists in the form of an “unlimited appetite without satisfaction,”5
“a morbid quest for money that defies the rules of reason,”6 a “[d]isregard
[for] how financial transactions affect others,”7 an “insensitivity to poverty
and to the unmet needs of others,”8 a disregard of societal norms and laws
in pursuit of “ultimate narcissistic fulfillment,”9 or an inability to perceive
conduct as corrupt or immoral.10 For the pathologically greedy,
“possessions serve an as an energizing elixir, even when they risked
corrupt practices to support their psychic elation.”11 To distinguish normal
from abnormal greediness, behavioral scientists engage in a “fine grained
analysis of circumstance and motive”12 that results in a precise diagnosis.
According to Smithian economics, greed in the form of self-interest,
ambition, and individualism is the linchpin of a capitalist society.13 Yet it
is indisputable that greed can be a catalyst for fraud. Unlike behavioral
science, the legal and business world lacks a definitive analytical
framework through which to differentiate normal greed (as in “I want a

3. Robert Waska, Craving, Longing, Denial, and the Dangers of Change: Clinical
Manifestations of Greed, 89 PSYCHOANALYTIC REV. 505, 505 (2002).
4. Greed, Dictionary.com, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/greed (last visited Feb.
18, 2008).
5. Arthur G. Nikelly, The Pleonexic Personality: A New Provisional Character Disorder,
48 INDIVIDUAL PSYCHOL.: J. OF ADLERIAN THEORY, RES. & PRAC. 253, 258 (1992); see also
Waska, supra note 3, at 505.
6. Nikelly, supra note 5, at 258.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. David P. Levine, The Corrupt Organization, 58 HUM. REL. 723, 725 (2005). Professor
Levine’s article provides a fascinating look at the Enron debacle through a psychological lens.
10. Id.
11. Nikelly, supra note 5, at 256.
12. See Julian Edney, Greed (Part I), 31 POST-AUTISTIC ECON. REV. art. 2 (2005),
http://www.paecon.net/PAEReview/issue31/Edney31.htm.
13. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS
14 (Edwin Cannan ed., Random House 1937) (1776) (“It is not from the benevolence of the
butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own
interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their self-love, and never talk to them
of our own necessities but of their advantages.”).
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promotion”) from pathological greed (as in “I want a promotion at any
cost”)—a socially and economically healthy appetite for success versus a
ravenous and destructive insatiability for wealth and power. Somewhat
confounded by the proper interrelationship of greed and capitalism,
business law wavers in its attempts to decipher, qualify, and regulate the
repercussions of corporate and personal greed.
In the context of civil securities fraud, the absence of a rubric for
gauging the role of avarice as an indicator of scienter has had a debilitating
effect on the common law. The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
of 1995 (PSLRA)14 requires that a complaint “state with particularity facts
giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the [scienter]
required [for the cause of action].”15 Plaintiffs have consistently, albeit
controversially, established the necessary intent through “motive and
opportunity” pleading: alleging facts evidencing the presence of a motive
in tandem with the perpetrator’s opportunity to commit the fraud.16
Undoubtedly, alleging a motive for the putative securities fraud is
important. Indeed, of the approximately one hundred reported circuit court
decisions that have addressed scienter since the passage of the PSLRA, not
a single case in which there was no apparent motive—or the motive
alleged was practically or economically nonsensical—survived the
dismissal stage.17 Thus, motive is an unspoken sine qua non of scienter.
Some courts have defined motive in this context as “concrete benefits
that could be realized by one or more of the false statements and wrongful
nondisclosures alleged.”18 Opportunity “entail[s] the means and likely

14. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1 to 78u-5
(2000 & Supp. IV 2004)). For consistency, this Article refers to the Reform Act as the PSLRA.
15. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2000). Most private securities fraud actions are brought under
Rule 10b-5, promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) under § 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2000). Though not explicitly mentioned in
the text of the Rule, scienter is nonetheless an essential element of a § 10(b) claim. See Broudo v.
Dura Pharms., Inc., 339 F.3d 933, 937 (9th Cir. 2003) (listing the elements of a securities fraud
claim under § 10(b)). Scienter is the “intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.” Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976). The Supreme Court has not further defined scienter other
than to indicate that scienter requires something more than negligence. See id. at 214–15.
16. See, e.g., Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 1130 (2d Cir. 1994).
17. See, e.g., R2 Invs. LDC v. Phillips, 401 F.3d 638, 644–47 (5th Cir. 2005) (holding that
scienter had been inadequately pleaded where, among other things, the defendants had no apparent
motive for the alleged fraud and their conduct and statements belied the plaintiffs’ assertion that
the defendants were trying to deceive or manipulate); Suez Equity Investors v. Toronto-Dominion
Bank, 250 F.3d 87, 100 (2d Cir. 2001) (dismissing a case against the three of six defendants who
had no financial stake in the transaction at issue and therefore no apparent motive to commit the
alleged fraud); Phillips v. LCI Int’l, Inc., 190 F.3d 609, 623 (4th Cir. 1999) (noting that the motive
alleged by the plaintiffs was inconsistent with what a rational person in the defendant’s position
would do to further his “own professional and economic interests”).
18. Shields, 25 F.3d at 1130.
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prospect of achieving concrete benefits by the means alleged.”19 However,
the term motive and opportunity has become something of a mantra when
analyzing scienter in cases brought under § 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act,20 with the meaning varying significantly from one court to
another. With disparate results, some plaintiffs have contended that
greed—in the form of perpetuating a prestigious executive position,
ensuring a gainful bonus, or maintaining the appearance of corporate
profitability—is a bona fide motive evidencing scienter. Because the
PSLRA provides no guidance as to the propriety of a motive and
opportunity pleading, judicial opinions of the last decade have muddled
the issue to the point of obscurity.21 Scattered and inconsistent in their
analyses, many opinions evade meaningful discussion of the role of greed
as an impetus for fraud and fail to differentiate between productive and
nefarious forms of greed.
Moreover, among the courts that have dealt with the matter, each has
injected its own, often differing, assumptions regarding the role of greed
in a capitalistic corporate environment. For example, some courts have
dismissively rationalized that “‘[g]reed is a ubiquitous motive, and
corporate insiders and upper management always have opportunity to lie
and manipulate.’”22 This rationalization de facto exonerates the putative
fraudster. Other courts have been more suspicious. Further entangling the
issue, a number of courts have blindly adopted the ubiquity-of-greed
mantra of their predecessors without discussing the financial motive’s role
within the specific case. The result is generalized confusion regarding
greed’s logical association with fraudulent intent, a lack of a standardized
framework for scrutinizing complaints alleging motive and opportunity to
demonstrate scienter, and an ensuing weakening of the intellectual and
prescriptive fibers of the common law.
With the PSLRA now into its second decade, there is abundant case
law interpreting the strong inference standard in a variety of factual
settings, including many appellate opinions that shed light on the role of
covetous motives as indicators of fraudulent intent. From this
jurisprudence we have constructed a framework for more orderly analysis
of the sufficiency of motive allegations. Using as a pattern the Ninth
Circuit’s approach to motive allegations involving insider stock
19. Id.
20. Helwig v. Vencor, Inc., 251 F.3d 540, 550 (6th Cir. 2001) (“We reaffirm that plaintiffs
cannot simply plead ‘motive and opportunity’ as a mantra for recovery under the [PSLRA].”).
21. See Phillips, 190 F.3d at 620 (acknowledging the “‘widespread disagreement among
courts’” as to what a plaintiff must show to properly plead scienter under the PSLRA (quoting In
re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 974 (9th Cir. 1999))).
22. Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1286 (11th Cir. 1999) (quoting Carley
Capital Group v. Deloitte & Touche, L.L.P., 27 F. Supp. 2d 1324, 1339 (N.D. Ga. 1998)).
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transactions, we advocate a contextual model for parsing greed that
identifies any one of three dimensions (or any combination thereof) that
can heighten ordinary profit-seeking activities to suspicious or unusual
conduct and can provide a motive that properly gives rise to a strong
inference of scienter.23
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II provides an overview of the
genesis and nature of the strong inference pleading standard and of the
debate that surrounded the standard’s interpretation during the PSLRA’s
first decade. This Part also examines the use of facts establishing motive
to meet that standard. Part III sketches the existing rubric for analyzing
allegations of insider stock transactions as support for an inference of
fraud. Part IV extends that rubric to other greedy motives of individuals
and corporate defendants. Part V concludes with thoughts on the order and
consistency that this contextual approach can and should create in the case
law.
II. PLEADING GREED AND THE “STRONG INFERENCE ” OF SCIENTER
Congress enacted the PSLRA as part of an attempt to curb perceived
abuses of securities fraud litigation.24 Among other major aspects in the
PSLRA, Congress established two heightened pleading requirements for
private securities litigation. The first requires the complaint to specify each
false statement or misleading omission and to explain why the statement
is false or misleading.25 As discussed above, the second requires that the
complaint state “with particularity” facts giving rise to a “strong
inference” that the defendant acted with the requisite scienter.26 Merely
reasonable inferences of scienter that can be drawn from a complaint
alleging securities fraud will not survive a motion to dismiss. Rather, the
complaint will survive only if its allegations collectively give rise to a
strong inference of scienter. 27
23. The purpose of our analysis is to gain insight into the kinds of motives that courts
consider relevant to the mix of facts that will ultimately decide the sufficiency of each case.
Allegations of “motive and opportunity” are often only one part of a court’s broader analysis that,
in each case, will have different fact patterns and allegations with varying degrees of substance,
cogency, and particularity. But see Press v. Chem. Inv. Servs. Corp., 166 F.3d 529, 538 (2d Cir.
1999) (holding that the defendant corporations’ motive of benefiting from a four-day “float” on a
treasury bill was sufficient to satisfy the necessary strong inference of scienter). For purposes of
this Article, we focus on the individual allegations of motive in each case and the court’s
subsequent disposition so that we can comment on the sufficiency of each allegation.
24. See Geraldine Szott Moohr, An Enron Lesson: The Modest Role of Criminal Law in
Preventing Corporate Crime, 55 FLA. L. REV. 937, 970–71 (2003).
25. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1) (2000).
26. Id. § 78u-4(b)(2).
27. In 2007, Supreme Court ruled on the question whether and to what extent a court must
consider competing inferences in determining whether a complaint establishes the necessary strong
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The development of the strong inference requirement is the doctrinal
root of our consideration of the role of greed, i.e., motive. As we know, the
PSLRA’s scienter pleading standard augmented the already heightened
pleading prescription for fraud established early on by Rule 9(b) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 9(b) states, “In all averments of
fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be
stated with particularity. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions
of mind of a person may be averred generally.”28 Although Rule 9(b)
provided that state of mind could be averred generally (as opposed to
“with particularity”), even before the advent of the PSLRA some circuits
had begun to require plaintiffs in securities fraud cases to plead facts that
would demonstrate the existence of scienter, rather than merely to plead
the conclusion that the defendant acted with scienter.29
Notably, as early as 1987, the Second Circuit began to require plaintiffs
suing under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act to plead facts that give
rise to a strong inference that the defendants possessed the requisite
fraudulent intent. A passage from Judge Newman’s opinion in Beck v.
Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co.30 wound up becoming black-letter law
in that circuit:
A common method for establishing a strong inference of
scienter is to allege facts showing a motive for committing
fraud and a clear opportunity for doing so. Where motive is
not apparent, it is still possible to plead scienter by
identifying circumstances indicating conscious behavior by
the defendant, though the strength of the circumstantial
allegations must be correspondingly greater.31

inference of scienter. See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 127 S. Ct. 2499, 2510 (2007)
(holding that to qualify as strong, an inference must be more than merely reasonable—it must be
“cogent and at least as compelling as any [plausible] opposing inference” of non-fraudulent intent).
28. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). See generally 2 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE ’S FEDERAL
PRACTICE, §§ 9.01–.11 (3d ed. rev. vol. 2002).
29. See, e.g., In re Time Warner Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259, 268–69 (2d Cir. 1993) (noting
that to establish scienter without “establishing a motive to commit fraud and an opportunity to do
so,” the plaintiff may “allege facts constituting circumstantial evidence of either reckless or
conscious behavior”); Romani v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, 929 F.2d 875, 878 (1st Cir. 1991)
(“Although a plaintiff need not specify the circumstances or evidence from which fraudulent intent
could be inferred, the complaint must provide some factual support for the allegations of fraud.”
(citing Wayne Inv., Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 739 F.2d 11, 13 (1st Cir. 1984))).
30. 820 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1987), abrogated on other grounds by United States v. Indelicato,
865 F.2d 1370 (2d Cir. 1989).
31. Id. at 50 (emphasis added) (citations omitted); see also In re Navarre Corp. Sec. Litig.,
299 F.3d 735, 746 (8th Cir. 2002) (noting that when a complaint does not show motive and scienter,
other allegations indicating scienter must be “particularly strong in order to meet the [PSLRA]
standard”).
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While it does not appear to say so, at the extreme, courts applied this
language to permit allegations of greedy motives alone to satisfy Rule
9(b).32 Five years later, in 1993, Judge Newman authored the opinion in In
re Time Warner Inc. Securities Litigation,33 which held that a complaint
passed muster with only motive and opportunity as its basis for alleging
scienter.34 Indeed, the only factual allegations supporting scienter in Time
Warner were the defendants’ desires to increase the corporation’s stock
price and to avoid jeopardizing corporate negotiations.35
For such relatively commonplace capitalist motives alone to give rise
to a strong inference of scienter was an extreme position that permitted
mere motive and opportunity to commit fraud to serve as a proxy for intent
to commit fraud. This position resulted in a somewhat loose interpretation
of corporate greed as evidence of fraud. Perhaps accordingly, the Second
Circuit rather quickly restricted the application of this rule, holding that
allegations of widespread motives—even seemingly potent ones like a
CEO’s desire to remain in that position—would not suffice to plead
scienter under Rule 9(b).36 Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, Inc.,37 decided in
1994, exemplifies this thinking and the Second Circuit’s refinement of its
pre-PSLRA strong inference rule:

32. Because “opportunity” is always present and rarely disputed, the two-part test quickly
disintegrates into a single inquiry turning on the sufficiency of the motive alleged. See, e.g., Ganino
v. Citizens Utils. Co., 228 F.3d 154, 170 (2d Cir. 2000) (noting that opportunity was not disputed
and therefore focusing on the challenge to the sufficiency of the motive alleged). The named
individual defendants in most cases, as high-level executives, officers, and directors of a
corporation, necessarily occupy positions of power, making them responsible for the alleged
misrepresentations to the market. See Pirraglia v. Novell, Inc., 339 F.3d 1182, 1191 (10th Cir.
2003) (“Moreover, defendants certainly had the opportunity to defraud investors; as the executives
in charge of the firm, they had control over its public statements and could influence the decisions
of investors and analysts.”); San Leandro Emergency Med. Group Profit Sharing Plan v. Philip
Morris Cos., 75 F.3d 801, 813 (2d Cir. 1996) (“There is no doubt that defendants as a group had
the opportunity to manipulate [stock prices] . . . . [They] held the highest positions of power and
authority within the company.”); Cohen v. Koenig, 25 F.3d 1168, 1173–74 (2d Cir. 1994).
Additionally, other common non-issuer defendants such as outside auditors, as agents of the
corporate defendant, will similarly have control over and the opportunity to make intentional
misrepresentations within the scope of their work. Courts have repeatedly maintained this
uncontroversial proposition. See, e.g., PR Diamonds, Inc. v. Chandler, 364 F.3d 671, 694 (6th Cir.
2004) (“‘[T]o allege that an independent accountant or auditor acted with scienter, the complaint
must allege specific facts showing that the deficiencies in the audit were so severe that they
strongly suggest that the auditor must have been aware of the corporation’s fraud.’” (quoting In re
SmarTalk Teleservices, Inc. Sec. Litig., 124 F. Supp. 2d 505, 514 (S.D. Ohio 2000))). For these
reasons, this Article focuses on the sufficiency of motive, while maintaining an occasional
reference to this type of pleading as “motive and opportunity.”
33. 9 F.3d 259, 261 (2d Cir. 1993).
34. Id. at 269–71.
35. Id.
36. See Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 1130 (2d Cir. 1994).
37. 25 F.3d 1124 (2d Cir. 1994).
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If motive could be pleaded by alleging the defendant’s desire
for continued employment, and opportunity by alleging the
defendant’s authority to speak for the company, the required
showing of motive and opportunity would be no realistic
check on aspersions of fraud, and mere misguided optimism
would become actionable under the securities laws.38
Other cases of roughly the same vintage as Shields elaborated on this
narrower version of “motive and opportunity,” dismissing as insufficient
such motives as an individual or corporate defendant’s desire to maintain
the corporation’s profitability or credit rating39 or to increase an
individual’s performance-based compensation.40 Shields and the other
Second Circuit opinions issued around that time, particularly Acito v.
IMCERA Group, Inc.41 and Chill v. General Electric Co.,42 were to become
especially popular authorities in later decisions both inside and outside the
Second Circuit. In fact, this triumvirate of cases, or some combination
thereof, from the so-called “Mother Court” of securities laws,43 has lent at
least indirect support to nearly all of the post-PSLRA appellate opinions
that have considered motive as part of a scienter analysis. This triumvirate
would eventually develop into something of an inapposite foundational
incantation in many opinions.
Then along came the PSLRA and its strong inference requirement.44
Predictably, the PSLRA did not expressly sanction any particular method
or methods of establishing the strong inference of scienter.45 Nor did any
of the legislative history of the PSLRA indicate with any certainty that
Congress intended to—or did not intend to—codify the Second Circuit’s
strong inference jurisprudence.46

38. Id. at 1130.
39. See San Leandro Emergency Med. Group Profit Sharing Plan v. Philip Morris Cos., 75
F.3d 801, 814 (2d Cir. 1996).
40. See Acito v. IMCERA Group, Inc., 47 F.3d 47, 54 (2d Cir. 1995) (“‘[I]ncentive
compensation can hardly be the basis on which an allegation of fraud is predicated.’” (alteration
in original) (quoting Ferber v. Travelers Corp., 785 F. Supp. 1101, 1107 (D. Conn. 1991))); see also
Chill v. Gen. Elec. Co., 101 F.3d 263, 268 (2d Cir. 1996) (“[S]uch a generalized motive, one which
could be imputed to any publicly-owned, for-profit endeavor, is not sufficiently concrete for
purposes of inferring scienter.”).
41. 47 F.3d 47 (2d Cir. 1995).
42. 101 F.3d 263 (2d Cir. 1996).
43. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 762 (1975) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
44. See supra notes 14–15 and accompanying text.
45. Joseph Grundfest & A.C. Pritchard, Statutes with Multiple Personality Disorders: The
Value of Ambiguity in Statutory Design and Interpretation, 54 STAN. L. REV. 627, 650–66 (2002)
(describing Congress’s contentment with the ambiguity of the PSLRA).
46. In fact, arguments can be and have been made both ways. Id. at 653–58; see also Marilyn
F. Johnson et al., In re Silicon Graphics Inc.: Shareholder Wealth Effects Resulting from the
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The circuit courts, when first addressing the new pleading standard,
purportedly fell into three camps.47 The Second Circuit naturally took the
position that the PSLRA had codified the circuit’s standard, including the
motive and opportunity formulation.48 The Third Circuit joined the
Second.49 On the other end of the spectrum, the Ninth Circuit posited that
Congress had rejected the Second Circuit’s rule and consequently that
motive and opportunity alone could never establish the requisite scienter.50
Preferring a middle ground, the remaining seven circuits chose not to be
tethered to any particular formulation of scienter.51 In the end, the lack of

Interpretation of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act’s Pleading Standard, 73 S. CAL. L.
REV. 773, 785–89 (2000) (noting the contentious and contradictory legislative history of the
PSLRA); William S. Lerach & Eric A. Isaacson, Pleading Scienter Under Section 21D(b)(2) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934: Motive, Opportunity, Recklessness, and the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 893, 930–56 (1996) (noting that the various
legislative drafts differed significantly); Hillary A. Sale, Heightened Pleading and Discovery Stays:
An Analysis of the Effect of the PSLRA’s Internal-Information Standard on ‘33 and ‘34 Act Claims,
76 WASH. U. L.Q. 537, 556–60 (1998) (chronicling the PSLRA’s history from the congressional
Contract With America through the veto override); Laura R. Smith, Comment, The Battle Between
Plain Meaning and Legislative History: Which Will Decide the Standard for Pleading Scienter
After the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995?, 39 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 577, 580–84
(1999) (“[T]he debate regarding the PSLRA [standard for scienter] is over the use of . . . conflicting
legislative history.”).
47. Fla. State Bd. of Admin. v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 270 F.3d 645, 658 (8th Cir. 2001)
(“The Circuits that have interpreted the [PSLRA] have fallen into (at least) three camps.”).
48. See Kalnit v. Eichler, 264 F.3d 131, 138 (2d Cir. 2001) (“The PSLRA’s language echoed
this Court’s scienter standard.”); Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 310 (2d Cir. 2000) (concluding
that the PSLRA “did not change the basic pleading standard for scienter in this circuit”). However,
the opinion cautioned against employing or relying on “magic words” when pleading scienter.
Novak, 216 F.3d at 311.
49. In re Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d 525, 534–35 (3d Cir. 1999) (“We believe
Congress’s use of the Second Circuit’s language compels the conclusion that the [PSLRA]
establishes a pleading standard approximately equal in stringency to that of the Second Circuit.”).
50. In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 978–79 (9th Cir. 1999) (“It
is . . . clear from the legislative history that Congress sought more specifically to raise the pleading
standard above that in the Second Circuit.”).
51. See Ottmann v. Hanger Orthopedic Group, Inc., 353 F.3d 338, 345–46 (4th Cir. 2003)
(“[C]ourts should not restrict their scienter inquiry by focusing on specific categories of facts, such
as those relating to motive and opportunity, but instead should examine all of the allegations in each
case to determine whether they collectively establish a strong inference of scienter.”); Green Tree
Fin. Corp., 270 F.3d at 659 (“Occupying the middle ground, the First, Fifth, Sixth, Tenth, and
Eleventh Circuits have held that the primary effect of the [PSLRA] is to require a pleading to state
facts giving rise to a ‘strong inference of scienter.’”); Nathenson v. Zonagen Inc., 267 F.3d 400,
411–12 (5th Cir. 2001) (“What must be alleged is not motive and opportunity as such but
particularized facts giving rise to a strong inference of scienter.”); City of Phila. v. Fleming Cos.,
264 F.3d 1245, 1261–63 (10th Cir. 2001) (“We agree with the middle ground . . . . [C]ourts must
look to the totality of the pleadings to determine whether the plaintiffs’ allegations permit a strong
inference of fraudulent intent.”); Helwig v. Vencor, Inc., 251 F.3d 540, 550–52 (6th Cir. 2001)
(“[P]laintiffs cannot simply plead ‘motive and opportunity’ as a mantra for recovery under the
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a consistent formulation has resulted in scattered and inconsistent
jurisprudence,52 with some courts and commentators still focusing their
discussions on the Second–Ninth polarity rather than on developing a
clearer rubric for this very fact-intensive inquiry.53
Despite the lack of a cohesive framework for scienter analysis, motive
undoubtedly plays an essential role in securities fraud cases. In an oftquoted post-PSLRA case, the Sixth Circuit described the role of motive
and opportunity this way: “While it is true that motive and opportunity are
not substitutes for a showing of recklessness, they can be catalysts to fraud
and so serve as external markers to the required state of
mind. . . .‘[M]otive’ and ‘opportunity’ are simply recurring patterns of
evidence.”54 Likewise, the Seventh Circuit described avaricious motives
as useful indicators but noted that the PSLRA does nothing to endorse
motive and opportunity pleading as “either necessary or sufficient.”55 The
Eleventh Circuit has also espoused the notion that greed may prompt
fraud, while expressing skepticism as to its potential as a barometer for
scienter in the corporate world:
Greed is a ubiquitous motive, and corporate insiders and
upper management always have opportunity to lie and
manipulate. Furthermore, allowing private securities class
actions to proceed to discovery upon bare allegations of
motive and opportunity would upset the delicate balance of
providing a remedy for genuine fraud while preventing
abusive strike suits that the [PSLRA] sought to achieve.
Motive and opportunity will ordinarily be relevant, and often
highly relevant . . . [but] a showing of motive and opportunity
standing alone [is] insufficient to allege securities fraud under
the “severe recklessness” standard established by the
Eleventh Circuit.56

[PSLRA].”); Greebel v. FTP Software, Inc., 194 F.3d 185, 195–97 (1st Cir. 1999) (“[W]hatever the
characteristic pattern of the facts alleged, those facts must now present a strong inference of
scienter.”).
52. Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1286 (11th Cir. 1999) (comparing In re
Time Warner Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259 (2d Cir. 1993), with Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, Inc., 25
F.3d 1124 (2d Cir. 1994), to conclude that “even within the Second Circuit, the wellspring of the
analysis, the status of the motive and opportunity test was somewhat uncertain, having been applied
in a seemingly inconsistent fashion”).
53. See, e.g., James V. Fazio, The Motive and Opportunity Test for Pleading Scienter Under
the Federal Securities Laws: Where Is It Now?, FED. LAW., May 2003, at 51, 51 (discussing the
inconsistent standards applied by the circuits).
54. Helwig, 251 F.3d at 550.
55. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs, Inc., 437 F.3d. 588, 601 (7th Cir. 2006), vacated,
127 S. Ct. 2499 (2007).
56. Bryant, 187 F.3d at 1286 (alterations in original) (quoting Carley Capital Group v.
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Whether motive or lack thereof is dispositive or merely relevant in a
given case,57 the fact remains that given the need for allegations of a
compelling motive for the purported fraud, courts reviewing dismissals for
lack of scienter nearly always engage in motive analysis. Thus, we are
inevitably led to philosophically and analytically challenging questions:
What is the proper role of greed in a business environment? How and
when does the presence of a financial motive evince fraudulent intent?
In an effort to begin to answer these questions, the next Part takes an
intensive look at the insider stock transactions model as a predicate to
reasoned analysis of other types of greedy motives.
III. INSIDER STOCK SALES: A MODEL FOR THE ANALYSIS OF
GREED ALLEGATIONS
Motive may be pleaded in a number of different ways, depending in
part on which defendant’s scienter is at issue. A plaintiff may adequately
plead the motive of individual defendants by showing propitiously timed
stock transactions or the defendant’s desire to augment compensation or
to maintain employment, but demonstrating corporate motives for
fraud—such as artificial inflation of stock price in anticipation of a stockbased acquisition—has proven to be more difficult.
Grappling with the greed problem, some courts, including the Second
Circuit, have focused on whether a motive provides a “concrete and
personal benefit” to the defendant.58 Adding to the muddled quality of the
jurisprudence in this area, the term “concrete and personal” is exceedingly
vague and awkward to apply to a corporation as a defendant. Other courts
use a “factors” approach, which examines the totality of the circumstances,
to analyze scienter allegations, with the financial motive to keep one’s job
being one of the factors considered.59 Regardless of the specific approach
used, the circuit courts apparently agree that a plaintiff may adequately
plead motive by alleging facts demonstrating that corporate insiders sold

Deloitte & Touche, L.L.P., 27 F. Supp. 2d 1324, 1339 (N.D. Ga. 1998)).
57. Ottmann v. Hangar Orthopedics Group, Inc., 353 F.3d 338, 345–46 (4th Cir. 2003)
(“[W]hile particular facts demonstrating a motive and opportunity to commit fraud (or lack of such
facts) may be relevant to the scienter inquiry, the weight accorded to those facts should depend on
the circumstances of each case.”).
58. See, e.g., Kalnit v. Eichler, 264 F.3d 131, 139–40 (2d Cir. 2001), quoted in In re K-tel
Int’l, Inc. Sec. Litig., 300 F.3d 881, 894 (8th Cir. 2002); GSC Partners CDO Fund v. Washington,
368 F.3d 228, 237 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Kalnit, 264 F.3d at 139); see also Ottmann, 353 F.3d at
352 (“‘[I]n order to demonstrate motive, a plaintiff must show concrete benefits that could be
realized by one or more of the false statements and wrongful nondisclosures alleged.’” (quoting
Phillips v. LCI Int’l, Inc., 190 F.3d 609, 621 (4th Cir. 1999))).
59. See infra Part IV.A.
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their shares at a profit while artificially inflating the corporation’s stock
price via misrepresentations about the corporation’s performance or
prospects. Indeed, insider stock transactions are the most common motive
alleged in cases reaching the circuit courts.60 Thus, the federal appellate
courts have significant experience in analyzing insider stock trades and the
financial motive these trades may provide for an inference of scienter in
a § 10(b) case.
The details of insider transactions during the period in which purported
misrepresentations were made to the marketplace are readily available to
plaintiffs,61 but it is the nature of the stock sales of record that might shed
light on an individual defendant’s scienter. This insight results because
insider stock sales can carry with them the assumption that the insider
timed the purchase or sale to accrue gains or avoid losses prior to releasing
material information to the public.62 To be sure, these allegations are
subject to other inferences.63 Therefore, complaints that base a defendant’s
scienter on motive demonstrated by insider stock trades must allege more
than that the defendant benefited from trading because of purported
misrepresentations. Instead, to satisfy the strong inference requirement,

60. The near omnipresence of allegations of insider stock transactions in class action fraudon-the-market cases has compelled some courts to reason that stock sales are the sine qua non of
motive and concrete personal benefit. See, e.g., Nathenson v. Zonagen Inc., 267 F.3d 400, 420–21
(5th Cir. 2001) (concluding that certain defendants’ abstention from trading stock undercut
allegations of motive); City of Phila. v. Fleming Cos., 264 F.3d 1245, 1270 (10th Cir. 2001)
(noting, in a case finding no inference of scienter, that no insider stock sales had been pleaded);
Keeney v. Larkin, 306 F. Supp. 2d 522, 535–36 (D. Md. 2003) (same), aff’d, 102 F. App’x 787 (4th
Cir. 2004); see also Helwig v. Vencor, Inc., 251 F.3d 540, 571–73 (6th Cir. 2001) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) (criticizing the majority for not being more diligent in its analysis of the scope and
context of the stock sales). But see In re Time Warner Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259, 269–71 (2d Cir.
1993) (holding that motive was adequately pleaded in a case with no insider stock transactions).
61. Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the SEC regulations
implementing § 16(a) require insiders to disclose changes in their beneficial interest in company
stock. Insiders have traditionally met this requirement by filing a “Form 4” with the SEC. See
generally Mandated Electronic Filing and Web Site Posting for Forms 3, 4 and 5, 68 Fed. Reg.
25,788 (May 13, 2003) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 232, 239, 240, 249, 250, 259, 260, 269,
274). Section 403 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 amended § 16(a) and now requires insiders
to file Form 4 within two business days of a transaction. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No.
107-204, § 403(a), 116 Stat. 745, 788 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a)(2)(C) (Supp. IV 2004)); Form
4, 17 C.F.R. § 249.104 (2007). Since May 2003, these disclosures must be filed with the SEC’s
publicly available electronic database, EDGAR, as well as on the corporation’s website. 15 U.S.C.
§ 78p(a)(4); Mandated Electronic Filing and Web Site Posting for Forms 3, 4 and 5, 68 Fed. Reg.
at 25,788.
62. See, e.g., Stevelman v. Alias Research Inc., 174 F.3d 79, 85 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that
the fact that corporate officers sold large portions of their stock during the class period “supports
the inference that [the CEO] withheld disclosures that would depress his stock until he had
profitably sold his shares”).
63. See supra note 27.
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the insider trades must be “unusual.”64 Courts thus will consider contextual
matters such as the total number of shares traded, the amount of the profit
made, the percentage of an individual’s stock holdings sold, or the number
of insiders who traded.65
The Ninth Circuit, in its seminal scienter opinion, In re Silicon
Graphics, Inc. Securities Litigation,66 summed up the insider-stocktransactions-as-motive analysis as follows:
Although “unusual” or “suspicious” stock sales by
corporate insiders may constitute circumstantial evidence of
scienter, insider trading is suspicious only when it is
“dramatically out of line with prior trading practices at times
calculated to maximize the personal benefit from undisclosed
inside information.” Among the relevant factors to consider
are: (1) the amount and percentage of shares sold by insiders;
(2) the timing of the sales; and (3) whether the sales were
consistent with the insider’s prior trading history.67
The other circuits have followed suit in rigorously analyzing the
context of insider trades before permitting the trades to be used to support
an inference of motive—and thereby scienter—in securities fraud cases.
The next section further defines the “unusual” nature of stock sales that
can elevate a generalized financial motive to one that may support a strong
inference of scienter.
A. Magnitude, Timing, and Atypicality as Indicators of Scienter:
The Stock Sales Construct
The factors identified by the Ninth Circuit in In re Silicon Graphics can
be referred to more generally as magnitude, timing, and atypicality. We
argue that these factors can and should provide the foundation for analysis
of the “concreteness” of other types of executive- and corporate-benefit
allegations in § 10(b) cases. But before extending the analysis, we define
these three contextual factors and provide examples that illustrate how
courts apply these factors in the setting of insider stock transactions.

64. In re Daou Sys., Inc., Sec. Litig., 411 F.3d 1006, 1022–23 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting
Greebel v. FTP Software, Inc., 194 F.3d 185, 198 (1st Cir. 1999)).
65. See Rothman v. Gregor, 220 F.3d 81, 94 (2d Cir. 2000); Oran v. Stafford, 226 F.3d 275,
290 (3d Cir. 2000); In re Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d 525, 540–41 (3d Cir. 1999).
66. 183 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 1999).
67. Id. at 986 (citations and footnote omitted) (quoting In re Apple Computer Sec. Litig., 886
F.2d 1109, 1117 (9th Cir. 1989)).
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1. Magnitude
In the context of an insider stock trade, courts have recognized that the
magnitude or amount of the benefit that accrued to the individual
defendant plays an important part in assessing the trade as an indicator of
scienter. As we have noted, whether a stock transaction is unusual depends
on a number of factors. Magnitude-related considerations include the
amount of profit made and the number of shares traded. Courts have also
looked at the “proportion of shares actually sold by an insider to the
volume of shares he could have sold.”68
In In re Suprema Specialties, Inc.,69 the Third Circuit looked at the
relative magnitude of the profit reaped versus the individual’s ordinary
compensation in an effort to determine whether the necessary strong
inference of scienter could be drawn.70 To that end, the court noted that
one officer’s “profits from [his] stock sale nearly doubled in one day the
total amount of money that he had made over the previous three years
combined.”71 The other officer alleged to have participated in the fraud
“netted . . . over four times his annual salary” from the suspect stock
sales.72 Such exponential figures militated in favor of a finding that the
officers intended to commit fraud.73
Nursing Home Pension Fund v. Oracle Corp.74 provides another
example of the comparative analysis courts use when assessing the
magnitude of insider stock sales. Investors brought a § 10(b) suit against
Oracle Corporation and three of its top executive officers, alleging that the
officers had intentionally concealed information about the poor technical
quality of a product and its ensuing losses.75 A month prior to the
inevitable disclosure of lower-than-anticipated sales, one Oracle executive

68. Id.; see also Southland Sec. Corp. v. INSpire Ins. Solutions, Inc., 365 F.3d 353, 380 (5th
Cir. 2004) (holding that total sales of more than 40% of the CEO’s stock during the class period
supported a strong inference of scienter); In re Cabletron Sys., Inc., 311 F.3d 11, 27, 40 (1st Cir.
2002) (finding that individual defendants’ sales of between one-third and 90% of their
stockholdings, along with other factors, gave rise to the necessary strong inference of scienter); In
re Scholastic Corp. Sec. Litig., 252 F.3d 63, 74–75 (2d Cir. 2001) (finding motive indicative of
scienter against an individual defendant who “sold a total of 19,400 shares—approximately 80
percent of his holdings” during the class period, netting him more than $1.25 million).
69. 438 F.3d 256 (3d Cir. 2006).
70. Id. at 278; see also In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1423 (3d
Cir. 1997) (considering the magnitude of profits reaped relative to the seller’s ordinary
compensation).
71. In re Suprema Specialties, 438 F.3d at 278.
72. Id.
73. See id.
74. 380 F.3d 1226 (9th Cir. 2004).
75. Id. at 1228–29.
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sold 2.1% of his holdings in the corporation and another sold 7%.76 The
district court focused on the percentage of stock sold, concluding that the
plaintiff’s allegations did not establish an unusual or heightened motive.77
In fact, the district court’s analysis of the proportion of stock sold was in
line with previous Ninth Circuit holdings.78 On appeal, however, the Ninth
Circuit departed from its own prior emphasis on percentage of
stockholdings as a relevant indicator, noting that the Oracle executive who
sold 2.1% of his stock made an “astronomical” $900 million in profit from
his proportionally small sale.79 In light of the sheer size of the benefit
reaped, the stock sales were categorized as unusual and, ultimately, this
categorization was instrumental in the reversal of the district court’s
dismissal of the case.80
Thus, in the stock sales setting, the magnitude factor may require
analysis of several different numbers. Typically, for a court to find that the
magnitude factor implies an insider had the requisite intent, the insider
must sell a subjectively large number of shares either in relation to his total
holdings, or in comparison to the amount the insider could have sold. In
the odd case, like Oracle, an objectively enormous profit earned or loss
avoided may imply the requisite intent.
2. Timing
As a factor affecting stock sales’ worth, timing may involve two
somewhat interrelated yet distinct considerations when assessing greedy
motives and scienter. The first refers to when the trade occurred in relation
to the purported misrepresentation or omission that defrauded the
plaintiffs. In the insider stock sales case, trading at a particular time
provides circumstantial evidence that the insider knew the best time to
trade because he had inside information that enabled him to sell (or buy)

76. Id. at 1232.
77. Id.
78. See, e.g., No. 84 Employer-Teamster Joint Council Pension Trust Fund v. Am. W.
Holding Corp., 320 F.3d 920, 939 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Most of the individuals sold 100% of their
shares, with the lowest percentage being 88%. The proceeds from these sales totaled over $12
million.”); In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 987 (9th Cir. 1999) (“All but two
of the officers in this case sold a relatively small portion of their total holdings . . . .”).
79. Oracle Corp., 380 F.3d at 1232.
80. See id. at 1231–35. On the other hand, where the magnitude of the stock sales cannot be
shown, the sales are not suspicious. For example, in In re PEC Solutions, Inc. Securities Litigation,
the Fourth Circuit affirmed dismissal of a suit where the four individual defendants sold “de
minimis” percentages of their stock holdings and “the Individual Appellees actually lost over $471
million dollars [sic] in collective stock value during the class period.” 418 F.3d 379, 390 (4th Cir.
2005). Because the class’s motive allegations were exclusively based on this particular greedy
motive, a strong inference of scienter could not be drawn. Id.
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the stock while the trading public was unaware of the “truth.” Thus,
though the insider’s stock trade may not be particularly unusual in
magnitude, if that same stock sale is made on the eve of a revelation that
would likely cause the company’s stock to plummet, a financial motive is
apparent and an inference of scienter is more appropriate.81 And, just as
importantly, if the defendant’s guilty knowledge is obtained later, or the
defendant trades after the release of negative information, there is no
greedy motive indicative of scienter.82
Timing may also refer to the temporal intersection of several seemingly
unrelated events, which together heighten the insider’s motive. Here we
refer to the coincidence of relevant peripheral indicia such as market- or
industry-wide phenomena,83 trading by other insiders,84 or even the

81. See, e.g., America West, 320 F.3d at 940 n.18 (finding suspicious a majority shareholder’s
sales of 100% of its stock in one class on the “day before the Wall Street Journal reported that [the
issuer] faced the prospect of substantial FAA sanctions”); Rothman v. Gregor, 220 F.3d 81, 94–95
(2d Cir. 2000) (holding that, though a “massive” profit regardless of percentage of stockholdings
sold could support a finding of motive and thereby scienter in the proper case, the individual
defendant’s profit of $20 million from sales of stock was insufficient to support such a finding
because his guilty knowledge could not be inferred until later; thus, the timing of the sales was not
suspicious); Stevelman v. Alias Research Inc., 174 F.3d 79, 85 (2d Cir. 1999) (recognizing that
under the pre-PSLRA standard unusual insider trading activity during the class period may permit
an inference of bad faith and scienter). Contra Lipton v. PathoGenesis Corp., 284 F.3d 1027, 1037
(9th Cir. 2002) (holding that stock sales immediately following a purported misrepresentation are
not suspicious because “[o]fficers of publicly traded companies commonly make stock transactions
following the public release of quarterly earnings and related financial disclosures”).
82. For example, in Nathenson v. Zonagen Inc., the Fifth Circuit approved of the district
court’s finding that the subject stock sales were not probative of scienter, stating: “As the district
court correctly observed, ‘[a]t most plaintiffs allege that one outside director sold a fraction of his
holdings at times that were unrelated to any Company announcements and at prices that were far
below that which he could have obtained by selling a few weeks earlier or later.’” 267 F.3d 400,
420 (5th Cir. 2001) (alteration in original) (quoting Nathenson v. Zonagen, Inc., No. H-98-0693,
1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23551, at *54 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 30, 1999), vacated on other grounds, 267
F.3d 400 (5th Cir. 2001)). The Fifth Circuit found that “‘inauspiciously timed’” sales do not meet
the plaintiff’s burden of showing a motive for fraud. Id. at 421 (quoting In re Apple Computer Sec.
Litig., 886 F.2d 1109, 1118 (9th Cir. 1989)); see also Rombach v. Chang, 355 F.3d 164, 177 (2d
Cir. 2004) (finding that the plaintiff’s allegation that individual defendants purchased large amounts
of stock after the price collapsed failed to establish scienter because there was no allegation that
the defendants sold the stock or profited in any way).
83. See, e.g., In re Cabletron Sys., Inc., 311 F.3d 11, 36–37 (1st Cir. 2002) (commenting that
an issuer’s nondisclosure of negative industry trends, though the trends are not required to be
disclosed, might supply a context for finding that insider stock transactions—and other
conduct—were unusual).
84. In fact, a number of cases support this notion by negative implication. Some courts have
pointed out that when no other officers sold stock during the same period, a plaintiff’s claim of
suspicious insider trading is fatally undermined. The Third Circuit’s opinion in In re Alpharma Inc.
Securities Litigation presents a typical example of this, pointing to the fact that the insider who
stood the most to gain in respect to the alleged fraud did not sell any stock at all. 372 F.3d 137, 152
(3d Cir. 2004); see also Abrams v. Baker Hughes, Inc., 292 F.3d 424, 434–35 (5th Cir. 2002);
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defendant’s resignation,85 at the time of the stock sale. These contextual
timing-related facts can also transform an otherwise ordinary sale into a
suspicious or unusual one for purposes of effectively pleading scienter.
Practically speaking, courts can and should look collectively at the
timing coincidences of the insider stock transactions alleged by plaintiffs.
The Ninth Circuit’s In re Daou Systems, Inc. decision86 provides a good
example of a case in which both types of timing were in play. The court
viewed the timing coincidences as heightening the inference available
from the relevant insider stock sales.87 There, the plaintiffs alleged that a
number of individuals not named as defendants—other corporate
executives and family members of the individual defendants—also sold
stock during the class period and that “‘98% of all insider sales . . . took
place on only two trading days.’”88 These facts, together with the
allegation that the individual insider defendants’ sales corresponded
“perfectly with the ‘huge increase in the price of Daou stock that
immediately followed [defendants’] false statements and reports,’”89
supported the Ninth Circuit’s finding that the defendants’ timing was
suspicious enough to surmount the strong inference hurdle, trumping the
defendants’ argument that they did not sell at the height of the company’s
inflated stock prices.90
Without any contextual support, allegations of a financial motive to
commit fraud fall flat. Timing—whether it be directly relating to the
misrepresentation or merely a confluence of disparate and independently
irrelevant circumstances—is a key element in determining the merit of
motive allegations for purposes of assessing scienter.91

Nathenson, 267 F.3d at 420–21; In re Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d 525, 540 (3d Cir. 1999).
The Ninth Circuit has adopted similar reasoning. Ronconi v. Larkin, 253 F.3d 423, 436 (9th Cir.
2001) (“One insider’s well timed sales do not support the ‘strong inference’ required by the
[PSLRA] where the rest of the equally knowledgeable insiders act in a way inconsistent with the
inference that the favorable characterizations of the company’s affairs were known to be false when
made.” (footnote omitted)); see also In re Worlds of Wonder Sec. Litig., 35 F.3d 1407, 1424–25
(9th Cir. 1994) (finding no scienter because the defendants “held onto most of their [company’s]
stock and incurred the same large losses” as the plaintiffs).
85. See, e.g., In re Suprema Specialties, Inc. Sec. Litig., 438 F.3d 256, 264–65, 277–78 (3d
Cir. 2006) (finding the timing of sales suspect for purposes of a motive analysis because “they
occurred just six weeks before [the company’s CFO and controller] resigned”).
86. 411 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2005).
87. Id. at 1022–25.
88. Id. at 1024 (alteration in original) (quoting complaint).
89. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting complaint).
90. Id.
91. See Oran v. Stafford, 226 F.3d 275, 290 (3d Cir. 2000) (finding that the sale of stock
alone is not evidence of scienter, but “‘if the stock sales were unusual in scope or timing, they may
support an inference of scienter’” (quoting In re Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d 525, 540 (3d
Cir. 1999))).
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3. Atypicality
The atypicality of an insider stock transaction refers to its
extraordinariness in some aspect other than magnitude or time. The
atypicality factor is ultimately driven by surrounding facts and relevant
history. When alleging insider stock transactions as evidence of a
defendant’s greedy motive, a plaintiff generally attempts to demonstrate
that the defendant’s transactions were inconsistent with prior trading
practices and unusual “in scope.”92 To that end, the complaint must offer
sufficient trading history for the court to adequately contextualize the
subject trades.93 This analysis of the atypicality of insider stock sales may
also involve a discussion of the defendants’ explanations for the sales. For
example, restrictions on trading may tend to mitigate the suspicious
amount or timing of sales in comparison with prior transactions.94 In this
regard, courts should look not only at the historical pattern of the insider’s
stock transactions but also at the transactions’ character as compared to
previous trades. For example, in No. 84 Employer-Teamster Joint Council
Pension Trust Fund v. America West Holding Corp.,95 the court found that
a majority shareholder’s stock sales were unusual when viewed in light of
that insider’s history of selling only warrants.96

92. See, e.g., In re Alpharma, Inc. Sec. Litig., 372 F.3d 137, 152 (3d Cir. 2004) (“[T]he
Complaint fails to allege that the sales of the remaining three individual defendants were unusual
in scope (e.g., compared to their total level of compensation or the size of previous sales) or
timing . . . .”); Oran, 226 F.3d at 290 (holding that the individual defendants’ stock sales did not
support an inference of scienter and noting that after reviewing numbers of shares traded by
defendants over a two-year period including the class period the review did “not demonstrate any
concerted insider effort to dispose of shares during the Class Period”).
93. See, e.g., In re Cerner Corp. Sec. Litig., 425 F.3d 1079, 1085 (8th Cir. 2005) (noting the
importance of prior trading history in analyzing whether stock sales were unusual); In re Apple
Computer Sec. Litig., 886 F.2d 1109, 1111, 1117 (9th Cir. 1989) (comparing the ten months
preceding a ten-month class period to determine whether the alleged insider trading was consistent
with the prior pattern of sales).
94. When an insider has been restricted from trading during a period, the proferred trading
history may be misleading, and sales, even of substantial amounts or percentages of stockholdings,
may be less suspicious. See, e.g., Ronconi v. Larkin, 253 F.3d 423, 436 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding that
a showing of the trading history spanning seven months before the class period and twelve months
after the period was not sufficient where the officers could not have legally traded during part of
those periods); In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 987–88 (9th Cir. 1999)
(finding that an insider’s sale of more than 75% of his stock during the class period was not
suspicious because he had been restricted from selling it before that time); see also Greebel v. FTP
Software, Inc., 194 F.3d 185, 206–07 (1st Cir. 1999) (finding that stock trades were not unusual and
explaining that the vast majority of the defendants’ stock trades were made by one individual after
he left the company).
95. 320 F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 2003).
96. Id. at 941.
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Thus, the atypicality prong of a court’s analysis requires an assessment
of the stock trades’ remarkable, exceptional, or anomalous nature when
viewed in light of surrounding circumstances. In one case, a variation in
scope as compared to a particular defendant’s prior trading pattern may be
peculiar, while in another an apparent concerted effort to dispose of stock
by a number of defendants may raise suspicion. The precise atypicality to
which a plaintiff can successfully point in alleging motive as evidence of
scienter will necessarily differ from case to case.
* * *
Ultimately, courts should consider atypicality allegations along with
any propitious timing or objective magnitude of the sales. An example of
this analysis is found in another section of the America West opinion,
where the Ninth Circuit looked at the trading history of the nine officer
and director defendants for whom stock sales allegedly created a motive
for fraud.97 The court found that the transactions were unusual and noted:
First, the amount and percentage of shares sold by individual
insiders was suspicious. Most of the individuals sold 100% of
their shares, with the lowest percentage being 88%. The
proceeds from these sales totaled over $12 million. . . .
Although “large numbers [and percentages] do not
necessarily create a strong inference of fraud,” the numbers
and percentages presented by Plaintiffs are troubling. . . .
Second, the timing of the sales also raises suspicions.
Unlike other cases where there were timing gaps between the
sales or where only one insider did the trading, here all nine
of the individuals’ sales occurred in succession over a three
month period when America West officials were making
optimistic statements regarding the company's financial
outlook and reassuring analysts that the settlement agreement
would have no economic effect. . . .
Third, the prior trading history of each defendant indicates
that the sales during the class period [were] unusual and
suspicious. None of the individual defendants sold stocks
during the twenty months preceding the ten month class
period. Nor did they sell for at least four months following
the class period. Thus, the sudden flurry of massive insider
trading over this three month period of time, after an
extended period of inactivity, appears unusual.98
97. Id. at 939–40.
98. Id. (citation and footnote omitted) (quoting In re Vantive Corp. Sec. Litig., 283 F.3d
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As demonstrated here, separately—and inevitably more compelling
when all factors overlap in the same case and are viewed together—the
magnitude, timing, and atypicality of insiders’ stock sales can and will
regularly give rise to a strong inference of scienter to propel a § 10(b) case
beyond the pleading stage. In the next Part, we broaden the reach of this
factors model for assessing scienter to cases in which the motive
allegations involve conduct and circumstances other than insider stock
transactions.
IV. EXTENDING THE CONTEXTUAL FACTORS APPROACH TO CASES
INVOLVING OTHER EXECUTIVE AND CORPORATE MOTIVES
Although insider stock transactions are frequently used to support the
scienter element in a § 10(b) case,99 plaintiffs do not always have
suspicious stock sales on which to rely to show an insider’s fraudulent
motive. But, like the ingenuity that spawns it, fraud’s impetus is also
multifarious. In the absence of an insider stock transaction,
plaintiff’s allege other motives that typically fall into two broad
categories: (1) compensation- and employment-related benefits for
individual defendants, and (2) corporate motives generally. Court
decisions on these motives are inconsistent and reflect no unifying
structure for analysis.100 Courts need a framework for the orderly and
consistent consideration of these motives.
As we saw in connection with insider stock transactions, the three
relevant factors that emerge for finding a motive for fraud are magnitude,
timing, and atypicality.101 This contextual approach is equally helpful in
assessing other possible motives. In the succeeding sections, we
demonstrate how courts can and should use the magnitude-timingatypicality construct to assess, on the one hand, individual employmentand compensation-related motives (other than stock trades) and, on the
other hand, a corporate entity’s motives that may give rise to scienter.

1079, 1093 (9th Cir. 2002)); see also In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410,
1424 (3d Cir. 1997) (finding that allegations of stock transactions by insiders were insufficient and
noting that “[t]o the extent plaintiffs choose to allege fraudulent behavior based on what they
perceive as ‘suspicious’ trading, they have to allege facts [providing a magnitude or atypicality
context] that support that suspicion”).
99. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
100. See supra notes 47–53 and accompanying text.
101. See supra Part III.A.
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A. Executive Compensation and Employment
Does an executive’s self-interested desire to increase her compensation
or to maintain her employment provide a proper basis for finding a motive
for fraud in a § 10(b) case? Unlike the readily ascertainable pecuniary gain
of stock sales, these financial motives typically manifest themselves more
indirectly. The argument that these indirect financial motives evidence
fraudulent intent runs as follows: the corporate executive was spurred to
misrepresent corporate information to personally reap an employment or
career advantage, such as increased compensation, a bonus, or the
perpetuation of a high corporate position.
The First and Sixth Circuits refer to “the self-interested motivation of
defendants in the form of saving their salaries or jobs” as a factor directly
relevant to the scienter analysis.102 Thus, in these courts, a defendant’s
preservation of her employment position and compensation creates a
possible motive for fraud. To the extent that a § 10(b) complaint alleges
this motive by using particularly pleaded facts, these courts appear to
weigh the allegations equally with other circumstances (for example,
whether there was an alleged disregard of the most current factual
information before making statements). If enough of the enumerated
factors are present in the case, the totality of the circumstances permits a
court to find the required strong inference of scienter.103
Other courts, however, have historically been reluctant to find these
types of allegations sufficient.104 These courts routinely find that a
defendant’s desire to maintain or increase her compensation simply does
not give rise to the required strong inference. Further, these courts tend to
assume, almost as a matter of judicial notice in § 10(b) cases, that all
executives want to increase their earnings and keep their jobs.
102. See Helwig v. Vencor, Inc., 251 F.3d 540, 552 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Greebel v. FTP
Software, Inc., 194 F.3d 185, 196 (1st Cir. 1999)).
103. See, e.g., City of Monroe Employees Ret. Sys. v. Bridgestone Corp., 399 F.3d 651,
683–86 (6th Cir. 2005) (finding a strong inference of scienter as to corporate defendant Firestone
where six of the nine factors identified in Helwig were present in the case, including “the selfinterested motivation of defendants in the form of saving their salaries or jobs” (citing Helwig, 251
F.3d at 552)).
104. See, e.g., Acito v. IMCERA Group, Inc., 47 F.3d 47, 54 (2d Cir. 1995) (“[T]he existence,
without more, of executive compensation dependent upon stock value does not give rise to a strong
inference of scienter.”); Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 1130 (2d Cir. 1994) (“If
motive could be pleaded by alleging the defendant’s desire for continued employment, . . . the
required showing of motive . . . would be no realistic check on aspersions of fraud, and mere
misguided optimism would become actionable under the securities laws.”); Tuchman v. DSC
Commc’ns Corp., 14 F.3d 1061, 1068 (5th Cir. 1994) (“‘[I]ncentive compensation can hardly be
the basis on which an allegation of fraud is predicated.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Ferber v.
Travelers Corp., 785 F. Supp. 1101, 1107 (D. Conn. 1991))).
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For instance, in Phillips v. LCI International, Inc.,105 the Fourth Circuit
commented that “allowing a plaintiff to prove a motive to defraud by
simply alleging a corporate defendant’s desire to retain his position with
its attendant salary . . . would force the directors of virtually every
company to defend securities fraud actions . . . every time that company
effected a merger or acquisition.”106 The Third, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits
have also deemed these types of allegations too generalized to support a
scienter argument.107 And the influential Second Circuit has repeatedly
taken this position. For example, in Kalnit v. Eichler,108 the plaintiffs
alleged that the individual defendants were motivated to make
misrepresentations to protect lucrative compensation provisions in a
pending merger agreement.109 Citing Acito v. IMCERA Group, Inc.110 and
Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, Inc.,111 the Second Circuit reasoned that “an
allegation that defendants were motivated by a desire to maintain or
increase executive compensation is insufficient because such a desire can
be imputed to all corporate officers.”112
These opinions seem to imply that incentive-based compensation or
other executive benefits can never support a strong inference of scienter.
But there are certainly circumstances in which a particular type of benefit
might be achieved only through a misrepresentation or omission—when

105. 190 F.3d 609 (4th Cir. 1999).
106. Id. at 623 (citation omitted).
107. See, e.g., GSC Partners CDO Fund v. Washington, 368 F.3d 228, 237 (3d Cir. 2004) (“In
every corporate transaction, the corporation and its officers have a desire to complete the
transaction, and officers will usually reap financial benefits from a successful transaction. Such
allegations alone cannot give rise to a ‘strong inference’ of fraudulent intent.”); Fin. Acquisition
Partners v. Blackwell, 440 F.3d 278, 290 (5th Cir. 2006) (finding that an allegation that executives
were motivated by a desire to keep their jobs was insufficient); No. 84 Employer-Teamster Joint
Council Pension Trust Fund v. Am. W. Holding Corp., 320 F.3d 920, 944–45 (9th Cir. 2003)
(noting that evidence regarding the possibility of a merger or the creation of alliances was too
generalized to establish scienter).
108. 264 F.3d 131 (2d Cir. 2001).
109. Id. at 140.
110. 47 F.3d 47, 54 (2d Cir. 1995).
111. 25 F.3d 1124, 1130 (2d Cir. 1994).
112. Kalnit, 264 F.3d at 139–40 (citing Acito, 47 F.3d at 54, and Shields, 25 F.3d at 1130); see
also Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 307–08 (2d Cir. 2000) (noting that motives generally
possessed by most corporate directors and officers, including the desire to keep stock prices high
to increase officer compensation, do not suffice as a concrete and personal benefit); Leventhal v.
Tow, 48 F. Supp. 2d 104, 115 (D. Conn. 1999) (“[T]he allegation that the defendants artificially
inflated Citizens’ stock price in order to ‘protect and enhance their executive positions’ and
‘negotiate as favorable a deal as possible’ on a pending employment contract also fail[s] to give rise
to a strong inference of scienter. This motive has been rejected routinely.” (citing Acito, 47 F.3d
at 54, Ferber v. Travelers Corp., 785 F. Supp. 1101, 1107 (D. Conn. 1991), and Glickman v.
Alexander & Alexander Servs. Inc., No. 93 Civ. 7594, 1996 WL 88570, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 29,
1996))).
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the compensation or benefit at issue is objectively large or otherwise out
of the ordinary, or when the need to misrepresent corporate performance
so as to retain one’s job is palpable. This raises an important question:
What makes an individual defendant’s compensation or employment
benefit so unusual or suspicious as to imply a motive for fraud? An
analysis of the existing case law demonstrates that consistent use of the
magnitude-timing-atypicality construct that this Article proposes would
provide future decisions in this area with consistency and, perhaps more
importantly, a firmer analytical footing. The following subsections discuss
each aspect of this proposed construct.
1. Magnitude
To be sure, some courts have already looked at the magnitude of the
benefits alleged in an effort to determine whether insiders had a motive for
fraud. In one case, for example, the court declined to find enhanced
bonuses a sufficient motive because of their trivial size.113 Conversely, at
least one case in the Eighth Circuit,114 as well as a case in the Fifth
Circuit,115 have found that the extraordinary magnitude of the
compensation the defendant stood to gain in connection with the fraud
supported a finding of motive and scienter. Clearly, the magnitude of the
compensation to be protected or gained serves as a useful indicator of
whether greed may have tainted a corporate executive’s conduct.116

113. In re Cerner Corp. Sec. Litig., 425 F.3d 1079, 1085 (8th Cir. 2005). The plaintiffs alleged
that the individual defendants were motivated to make the alleged misstatements by their desire to
increase their bonuses and overall executive compensation packages. Id. However, the court
pointed out that the largest incentive bonus paid to any one individual defendant was approximately
$355,000, and the aggregate bonuses paid were only about $1 million. The court then summarily
concluded that the magnitude of the bonuses did not justify a finding of improper motive. Id. The
Eighth Circuit has similarly found motive allegations based on increased bonuses insufficient where
the largest single bonus was $630,000, the aggregate of the bonuses concerned was just over $1.7
million, and no other suspicious circumstances were present. See Kushner v. Beverly Enters., Inc.,
317 F.3d 820, 830 (8th Cir. 2003).
114. Fla. State Bd. of Admin. v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 270 F.3d 645, 661, 664 (8th Cir. 2001)
(noting that the $102 million benefit to an individual defendant was extraordinary and, in
conjunction with suspicious timing circumstances, “created a powerful incentive to see to it that
Green Tree made plenty of money”).
115. Barrie v. Intervoice-Brite, Inc., 397 F.3d 249, 260–61 (5th Cir. 2005) (finding that an
executive who stood to earn a bonus of 175% of his annual salary had a motive to commit fraud).
116. Some time ago, one commentator suggested as much. See Elliott J. Weiss, The New
Securities Fraud Pleading Requirement: Speed Bump or Road Block?, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 675, 687
(1996) (espousing the view that incentive-based compensation can indeed provide a motive to
commit fraud and recommending that courts review the magnitude of the benefit accrued to assess
the sufficiency of scienter allegations).
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Indeed, the use of the magnitude factor that this Article proposes may
have changed the outcome in at least one Second Circuit case. Albert
Fadem Trust v. Citigroup, Inc.117 was a class action securities fraud suit,
filed in the wake of the Enron and WorldCom scandals, alleging that
Citigroup’s and various individuals’ participation in the fraudulent
scandals ultimately redounded to the detriment of Citigroup
shareholders.118 The plaintiffs alleged that fraud and conflicts of interest
generated “huge returns” for Citigroup in its transactions with Enron,
Dynegy, and WorldCom, which translated into outlandish compensation
to so-called “star” stock analyst defendant Jack Grubman.119 In fact, it was
common knowledge at the time that Grubman’s largely incentive-based
compensation stood at $20 million per year—a figure unprecedented in the
context and history of stock analyst remuneration. This figure did not
include any undisclosed profits that he may have made trading on his own
account in stocks he followed, stocks for which he and his firm, Smith
Barney/Citigroup, were alleged to have given biased recommendations to
the investing public.120
Nonetheless, the Second Circuit was unwilling to draw a strong
inference of scienter, instead finding simply that the complaint provided
no basis to conclude that defendants “were undertaking the challenged
transactions for motives other than long-term profitability through the
cultivation of major clients.”121 The court merely affirmed the district
117. 165 F. App’x 928 (2d Cir. 2006).
118. Id. at 929. The facts are set forth more fully in the district court’s opinion in the case. See
In re Citigroup, Inc., Sec. Litig., 330 F. Supp. 2d 367, 370–74 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), aff’d sub nom.
Albert Fadem Trust, 165 F. App’x at 928.
119. In re Citigroup, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 2d at 370–71, 374, 380.
120. See ARIANNA HUFFINGTON, PIGS AT THE TROUGH: HOW CORPORATE GREED AND
POLITICAL CORRUPTION ARE UNDERMINING AMERICA 161–65 (2003) (referring to Grubman’s
annual $20 million salary and describing specific conflicts of interest from which he and his
employer suffered, as well as the massive profits generated thereby). One commentator has
frequently discussed the issues involved in the general shifting of stock analysts’ roles from
providing investment advice to salesmanship. See generally Gretchen Morgenson, Requiem for an
Honorable Profession, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 2002, § 3, at 1; Gretchen Morgenson, Buy, They Say.
But What Do They Do? I.P.O. Conflicts Bedevil Analysts, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 2001, § 3, at 1;
Gretchen Morgenson, How Did So Many Get It So Wrong?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 2000, § 3, at 1.
Details of the conflicts of interest presented by investment banking arms of brokerage houses
securing lucrative banking business by promising issuers biased research and overblown stock
recommendations, as well as the ensuing industry-wide settlement payments totaling billions of
dollars are set forth well and succinctly in PHILIP AUGAR, THE GREED MERCHANTS: HOW THE
INVESTMENT BANKS PLAYED THE FREE MARKET GAME 17–21 (2005). See also FRANK PARTNOY,
INFECTIOUS GREED: HOW DECEIT AND RISK CORRUPTED THE FINANCIAL MARKETS 355–56, 366–76
(2003) (detailing the spectacular WorldCom financial failure, Grubman’s unique relationship with
WorldCom, and his astronomical annual salary during the period 1998–2001).
121. Albert Fadem Trust, 165 F. App’x at 930; accord Thacker v. Medaphis Corp., No. 97
Civ. 2849, 1998 WL 684595, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 1998) (finding that the plaintiff’s contention
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court’s finding that compensation based on corporate revenues was not a
“concrete benefit” that could supply a sufficient motive.122 Rather than fall
back on this ubiquity mantra, the Second Circuit’s decision might have
been more defensible had it discussed the extraordinary compensation
involved and allowed this compensation to inform the court’s scienter
ruling at the pleading stage.
2. Timing
Like the timing of stock sales, the timing of executive pay or benefits
might occasionally transform otherwise routine self-interest into a
suspicious motive. Florida State Board of Administration v. Green Tree
Financial Corp.123 provides a good illustration. In that case, a financial
services corporation, its CEO, and several other executives allegedly
overstated the corporation’s financial value to maximize the CEO’s
remuneration.124 In dismissing the case, the district court cited the Second
Circuit’s decisions in Acito and Shields for the general proposition that
enhanced executive compensation does not give rise to a motive sufficient
to support the necessary strong inference.125
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit scrutinized the motive allegations more
closely, in particular their magnitude and timing dimensions.126 Green
Tree’s CEO was allegedly the “highest paid business executive in the
entire United States” in 1995 and 1996, with an employment agreement
worth more than $102 million in cash and stock in 1996 alone.127
Moreover, the court noted the allegation that the CEO’s employment
contract, which entitled him to 2.5% of the corporation’s pre-tax income,
was set to expire on December 31, 1996, providing him with an urgent
need to capitalize on the contract’s favorable provisions before the end of
the year.128 Reversing the dismissal of the suit, the Eighth Circuit reasoned
that the defendant was motivated by a desire to eliminate competitors and to acquire related
companies was insufficient to plead scienter because the motive could be imputed to any corporate
officer).
122. See Albert Fadem Trust, 165 F. App’x at 930; In re Citigroup, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 2d at
380.
123. 270 F.3d 645 (8th Cir. 2001).
124. Id. at 661.
125. In re Green Tree Fin. Corp. Stock Litig., 61 F. Supp. 2d 860, 873 (D. Minn. 1999) (citing
Acito v. IMCERA Group, Inc., 47 F.3d 47, 54 (2d Cir. 1995), and Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp,
Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 1130 (2d Cir. 1994)), rev’d sub nom. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 270 F.3d at 645.
The district court was also persuaded by the fact that the CEO was forced to return much of the
compensation involved after the corporation’s financials were restated because this disgorgement
militated against a finding of scienter. Id.
126. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 270 F.3d at 661.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 650.
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that “the magnitude of [the CEO’s] compensation package, together with
the timing coincidence of an overstatement of earnings at just the right
time to benefit [the CEO,] provide[d] an unusual, heightened showing of
motive to commit fraud” on his part as well as the corporation’s.129
This approach properly considers the manner in which timing can
convert simple self-interest into a greedy motive. As we see below, the
atypicality of an alleged compensation-based motive can be equally
compelling.
3. Atypicality
Atypicality refers to the unusual quality of a defendant’s motivation to
commit fraud: What is it about the executive’s financial motive, other than
magnitude or timing, that places it outside the scope of ordinary,
commonly accepted business conduct? Indeed in some cases,
extraordinary, atypical circumstances can elevate the normal desire to
retain a high-paying job, or to be rewarded with a large bonus, to an
improper motive for fraud.
In No. 84 Employer-Teamster Joint Council Pension Trust Fund v.
America West Holding Corp.,130 the Ninth Circuit considered allegations
involving artificial inflation of the company’s stock price. The executives’
eligibility for stock options and bonuses was tied to the company’s
financial performance, subject to a final determination by a compensation
committee.131 Although such compensation structures are typical, the
unusual circumstance contributing to a finding of improper motive was the
fact that the compensation committee was controlled by the executives and
shareholders who had clearly orchestrated the fraud (and sold over 90% of
their own stock).132 This committee generously rewarded the three
executives in an unusual manner: these executives were the only ones to
receive stock options and had not received any the year before.133 Though
none of the executive defendants had engaged in insider trading, the court
found that the composition of the compensation committee, along with the
suspicious reward, was enough to indicate extraordinary circumstances in
which scienter might be established.134
The Tenth Circuit’s decision in Pirraglia v. Novell, Inc.135 similarly
exemplifies a proper use of the atypicality factor. In Pirraglia, a computer
software manufacturer and its executives were accused of making false
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id. at 661.
320 F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 944.
See id. at 939, 944.
Id. at 944.
Id. at 941.
339 F.3d 1182 (10th Cir. 2003).
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statements about inventory and otherwise engaging in accounting fraud,
allegedly motivated by the executives’ desire to protect their
employment.136 Although a desire to protect one’s employment is
frequently viewed as an insufficient motive, the Tenth Circuit recognized
that protection of an executive position may provide a motive for fraud in
an unusual setting.137 Apparently, former Novell president and CEO
Robert Frankenberg had sanguinely predicted revenue growth in his public
statements.138 When Novell’s stock instead fell, Frankenberg was forced
to resign his post, and then-executive vice president Joseph Marengi was
promoted to president. There was great pressure on the new management
to bolster the company’s stock price and to increase revenues. When his
team’s efforts proved unsuccessful, Marengi was also fired. In its analysis
of motive, the Tenth Circuit concluded that “the defendants in the instant
case had especial cause to think that they would lose their jobs if they
failed to produce results, given the recent termination of Frankenberg.”139
This pressure, the court reasoned, was indicative of scienter, especially
because Marengi’s feared termination became a reality. The Tenth Circuit
took this atypical motive into account in reversing the district court’s
dismissal of the case.140 The First Circuit decided a pair of cases
similarly.141
Thus, in assessing motive to determine whether a defendant had
fraudulent intent, courts should look at the atypicality of the allegations
of a personal and concrete benefit. In some cases, the driving force behind
an executive’s conduct will be stronger, more urgent, or otherwise
different from the ordinary capitalistic profit motive. It is such atypicality
that can, and in the proper case should, aid in drawing a strong inference
of scienter.
* * *
In sum, greed in the form of seeking a personal advantage through job
retention or an attractive bonus is often unconvincing as evidence of
scienter. This is understandable in an intensely capitalist society that
enables and encourages not only mere subsistence but also prosperity. But
not all conduct geared at achieving wealth or maintaining a high standard
of living is acceptable, even if this conduct is widespread. Courts

136. Id. at 1184–85.
137. See id. at 1191.
138. Id. at 1185.
139. Id. at 1191.
140. Id. at 1194.
141. See Aldridge v. A.T. Cross Corp., 284 F.3d 72, 83–84 (1st Cir. 2002); In re Cabletron
Sys., Inc., 311 F.3d 11, 39 (1st Cir. 2002).
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considering scienter and motive in § 10(b) cases must distinguish simple
self-interest from corrupt or excessively acquisitive motives. The
magnitude-timing-atypicality construct distills such motives and aids in
assessing their propriety as indicia of scienter. In the following section, we
apply this same contextual model to the motives that a corporation might
have to commit fraud. Though the way people and corporate entities act
may differ, their drives to survive and to excel financially are in fact the
same. Thus, the model is equally efficacious in this context.
B. Corporate Motives
Although there is some overlap between benefits accruing to
individuals and those that might provide a motive for a corporation to
commit fraud—insider trading and performance-based compensation are
both dependent on stock price, which a company naturally desires to keep
high—the allegations of benefits to corporate defendants are somewhat
different from those typically pleaded against individual defendants. For
instance, some judicial opinions have discussed corporate motivations
such as performing especially well in a fiftieth-anniversary year,142
beginning a campaign to attract new investors,143 avoiding delisting by a
stock exchange,144 and maintaining favorable relationships with
creditors.145 Like they have with greedy motives alleged against
individuals, courts have reasoned that to allow such “ordinary and
appropriate corporate objectives” to sustain a finding of scienter would, in
effect, “support a finding of fraudulent intent for all companies that plan
to lower costs and expand sales.”146 Accordingly, these types of
motivations have often been rejected as insufficient evidence of scienter.
Similarly, some plaintiffs allege that the fraud was motivated by a
desire to sustain the “appearance of corporate profitability, or of the
success of an investment,”147 or to maintain a high corporate credit
rating.148 These complaints often fail as exceedingly generalized and

142. See In re Scientific-Atlanta, Inc. Sec. Litig., 239 F. Supp. 2d 1351, 1366 (N.D. Ga. 2002),
aff’d sub nom. Phillips v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 374 F.3d 1015 (11th Cir. 2004).
143. See Plotkin v. IP Axess Inc., 407 F.3d 690, 692–93, 697–701 (5th Cir. 2005).
144. See In re K-tel Int’l, Inc. Sec. Litig., 300 F.3d 881, 887–88, 896–99 (8th Cir. 2002)
(finding allegations that a corporation sought to avoid delisting from NASDAQ insufficient).
145. See Ottmann v. Hanger Orthopedic Group, Inc., 353 F.3d 338, 352 (4th Cir. 2003).
146. Lipton v. Pathogenesis Corp., 284 F.3d 1027, 1038 (9th Cir. 2002).
147. Chill v. Gen. Elec. Co., 101 F.3d 263, 268 (2d Cir. 1996).
148. See San Leandro Emergency Med. Group Profit Sharing Plan v. Philip Morris Cos., 75
F.3d 801, 813–14 (2d Cir. 1996) (finding that a “company’s desire to maintain a high bond or credit
rating” was insufficient motive for fraud because the motive could be imputed to any company
(citing Acito v. IMCERA Group, Inc., 47 F.3d 47, 54 (2d Cir. 1995))); see also Fla. State Bd. of
Admin. v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 270 F.3d 645, 664 (8th Cir. 2001) (stating in dicta that the desire
to maintain a high credit rating or to make a company appear attractive to potential buyers may be
“too thin a reed on which to hang an inference of scienter”).
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ordinary because allowing such commonly held motives to vault a
complaint past the dismissal stage arguably opens the floodgates of
securities fraud litigation.149 Other fraudulent corporate motives alleged
include concealing negative information to secure a line of credit,150 to
avoid breaching a loan covenant,151 or to gain regulatory approval.152 These
motives have also been found to be “ordinary and appropriate corporate
objectives” and therefore not indicative of scienter.153 Complaints that
weave a story of the corporation’s desire to keep stock prices high against
the backdrop of a corporate acquisition strategy154 or an upcoming
merger155 have also generally been met with skeptical judicial responses.
These courts reason that this type of complaint “is the very type of ‘motive
and opportunity’ pleading the PSLRA was meant to eliminate.”156 As a
matter of fact, if the allegations are conclusory and not based on
particularized facts, the PSLRA demands their rejection. But not every
financial motive a for-profit corporation has is legitimate, and these motive
allegations should not be dismissed out-of-hand in a court’s scienter
analysis.
It turns out that the reasoning in many of these cases can be traced back
to the trio of early Second Circuit cases.157 A number of post-PSLRA
appellate opinions cite or quote Acito for the proposition that if scienter
can be pleaded merely by alleging that officers and directors possess
motive and opportunity to enhance a company’s business prospects, then
“virtually every company in the United States that experiences a downturn
in stock price could be forced to defend securities fraud actions.”158 Of
course, this rationale is simple and somewhat persuasive, but only in a

149. See Acito, 47 F.3d at 54 (concluding that if motives to enhance a company’s business
prospects were indicative of scienter, “virtually every company in the United States that
experiences a downturn in stock price could be forced to defend securities fraud actions”).
150. See Lipton, 284 F.3d at 1031.
151. See Howard v. Everex Sys., Inc., 228 F.3d 1057, 1060 (9th Cir. 2000).
152. See Lipton, 284 F.3d at 1038.
153. Id.; see also City of Phila. v. Fleming Cos., 264 F.3d 1245, 1269 (10th Cir. 2001)
(holding that common or “shared business motive[s]” such as reducing customer litigation or
facilitating a notes offering are insufficient as a matter of law).
154. See, e.g., In re Daou Sys., Inc., Sec. Litig., 411 F.3d 1006, 1012–13, 1024 (9th Cir. 2005);
Keeney v. Larkin, 102 F. App’x 787, 788–89 (4th Cir. 2004); Kalnit v. Eichler, 264 F.3d 131,
140–41 (2d Cir. 2001).
155. See, e.g., Kane v. Zisapel, 32 F. App’x 905, 905–06 (9th Cir. 2002); Phillips v. LCI Int’l,
Inc., 190 F.3d 609, 622–24 (4th Cir. 1999) (affirming the dismissal of a case in which the plaintiffs’
allegations that a corporate director sought to depress the stock price to assure the success of a
merger did not provide the director with adequate personal motive, but failing to discuss the
viability of the motive vis-à-vis the corporate-entity defendant).
156. Kane, 32 F. App’x at 906 (quoting In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970,
988 (9th Cir. 1999)).
157. See supra notes 41–42 and accompanying text (discussing Shields, Acito, and Chill).
158. Acito v. IMCERA Group, Inc., 47 F.3d 47, 54 (2d Cir. 1995).
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“Henny Penny”159 sort of way. Since the passage of the PSLRA, the
Second Circuit itself has explained that Acito, Shields, and Chill v. General
Electric Co.160 should not be read to make the task of pleading corporate
scienter insurmountable.161 This admonition is critical because pleading
and proof of corporate, as opposed to individual, scienter is uniquely
elusive,162 especially in cases where plaintiffs do not have access to
“specifically greedy comments from an authorized corporate
individual.”163
In assessing a corporation’s motive, given that scienter is easier to
conceal within a compartmentalized corporate structure, courts must
scrutinize motives more carefully and must not resort to the short shrift of
the ubiquity mantra. Certainly a more rigorous look at the context of the
putative motive for fraud can reveal intentions on the part of a corporation
that are strongly suggestive of scienter. In the next few subsections, we
apply our contextual model to assess (1) the magnitude of a corporate
advantage to be gained, (2) the questionable timing of a misrepresentation
so as to aid in achieving a corporate objective, and (3) the atypicality of a
benefit to a corporation that would accrue as a result of an alleged fraud.
1. Magnitude
Corporate motives such as earning fees or cultivating clientele have
traditionally been seen as insufficient indicators of scienter. The opinions
in In re Suprema Specialties, Inc. Securities Litigation,164 Klein v. Autek
Corp.,165 and GSC Partners CDO Fund v. Washington166 together reflect
the judiciary’s unwillingness to find that an underwriter’s or law firm’s
purported motive to earn fees, without more, is sufficient to show
scienter.167 However, when the fees or the benefits to the entity defendant

159. “Henny Penny” (a.k.a. Chicken Licken, Chicken Little, or The Sky is Falling) is a fable
of unknown origin about a chicken who concludes that the sky is falling after being hit in the head
with a falling acorn. The Sky is Falling, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Sky_Is_
Falling_(fable) (last visited Feb. 18, 2008). The phrase “the sky is falling” has become part of our
modern lexicon, used to indicate a “hysterical or mistaken belief that disaster is imminent.” Id.
160. 101 F.3d 263 (2d Cir. 1996).
161. See, e.g., Press v. Chem. Inv. Servs. Corp., 166 F.3d 529, 538 (2d Cir. 1999).
162. See generally Patricia S. Abril & Ann M. Olazábal, The Locus of Corporate Scienter,
2006 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 81 (discussing various issues associated with ascribing intent to a
corporation).
163. Press, 166 F.3d at 538.
164. 438 F.3d 256 (3d Cir. 2006).
165. 147 F. App’x 270 (3d Cir. 2005).
166. 368 F.3d 228 (3d Cir. 2004).
167. See In re Suprema Specialties, 438 F.3d at 282–83; Klein, 147 F. App’x at 277; GSC
Partners, 368 F.3d at 238. But see Press, 166 F.3d at 538 (holding that a bank’s alleged motive to
take advantage of the “float” between the maturity date and the date funds are disbursed to a client
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are of considerable magnitude, courts should look closely at such motives.
In Fidel v. Farley,168 the Sixth Circuit hinted at this approach.169 In this
§ 10(b) case against the accounting firm Ernst & Young, the plaintiffs
alleged, among other things, that the significant fees earned by the firm
from its client, Fruit of the Loom, provided the motive to defraud.170
Discussing the insufficiency of the motive allegations to establish scienter,
the court stated:
Absent any allegations that Ernst & Young’s fees from Fruit
of the Loom were more significant than its fees from other
clients or that Fruit of the Loom represented a significant
portion of Ernst & Young’s revenue, it is difficult to surmise
how Ernst & Young’s desire to keep Fruit of the Loom as a
client would be any different from its desire to keep any
client and thus be indicative of fraud.171
If such an approach had been followed in Albert Fadem Trust v.
Citigroup, Inc.,172 discussed earlier with respect to the magnitude of an
executive’s compensation,173 surely the court would have been more
inclined to recognize defendant Citigroup’s strong motive for fraud. There,
plaintiffs alleged that billions of dollars in corporate earnings (and,
perhaps more importantly, losses avoided) were at stake in Citigroup’s
dealings with Enron, Dynegy, and WorldCom.174
2. Timing
Timing, as they say, is everything. Just as auspiciously timed stock
sales can put money into the pockets of greedy executives, so too can welltimed misrepresentations about a company’s finances reap benefits, or,
perhaps more often, forestall imminent negative consequences to
corporations.

after expiration of a treasury bill sufficed, albeit “barely,” to plead scienter in a case alleging the
bank’s misrepresentation of the availability of funds at maturity).
168. 392 F.3d 220 (6th Cir. 2004).
169. See id. at 233.
170. Id. at 223, 228, 232.
171. Id. at 233 (emphasis added).
172. 165 F. App’x 928 (2d Cir. 2006).
173. See supra notes 117–22 and accompanying text.
174. See PARTNOY, supra note 120, at 296–392 (detailing the financial frauds at Enron,
Dynegy, and WorldCom, and the billions of dollars that Citigroup had at stake in those companies);
see also AUGAR, supra note 120, at 177–203 (arguing that investment bankers at Citigroup, and
other banks, were largely responsible for the epic financial failures at the turn of the millennium
and describing Citgroup’s Robert Rubin’s now infamous “This is probably a bad idea”
conversation—about a possible government bailout of Enron—with Peter Fisher of the U.S.
Treasury Department).
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Though actual corporate profitability, both short- and long-term,
benefits firms, their employees, and their investors, the appearance of
profitability has an entirely different effect. By definition, when a
company creates an appearance of profitability, the truth is otherwise, and
the company has manipulated information (typically accounting figures)
to disguise the truth. This behavior is, in fact, fraud. Yet too often this
motive to manipulate has also been dismissed as normal, acceptable,
profit-seeking conduct. In fact, a number of courts have gone so far as to
state that the desire to make a company seem more profitable is
“universally held among corporations and their executives,” and thus this
desire is insufficient to prove scienter as a matter of law.175
Because the federal securities laws require publicly traded corporations
to announce their earnings to investors every three months, by way of
financial reports filed with the SEC,176 it is no surprise that corporations
have been known to engage in—and thus plaintiffs have brought securities
fraud suits based on—false quarterly reporting. Indeed, a rosy facade
bespeaking success is at the heart of many § 10(b) cases alleging that
misleading corporate financial reports defrauded investors.177
No doubt companies legitimately use their quarterly and annual
financial reports to display and even highlight their profitability.178 But
creating an illusion of success requires intentional deceit.179 As the reader
is well aware, in the decade immediately following the passage of the
PSLRA, the securities markets went through a classic boom and bust.180
175. Fla. State Bd. of Admin. v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 270 F.3d 645, 664 (8th Cir. 2001)
(citing Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 307 (2d Cir. 2000), and San Leandro Emergency Med.
Group Profit Sharing Plan v. Philip Morris Cos., 75 F.3d 801, 814 (2d Cir. 1996)); see also In re
K-tel Int’l, Inc. Sec. Litig., 300 F.3d 881, 894 (8th Cir. 2002); Kalnit v. Eichler, 264 F.3d 131, 139
(2d Cir. 2001) (“Insufficient motives, we have held, can include (1) the desire for the corporation
to appear profitable . . . .” (emphasis added) (citing Novak, 216 F.3d 307–08)).
176. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-13 (2007).
177. See, e.g., Plotkin v. IP Axess Inc., 407 F.3d 690, 701–02 (5th Cir. 2005); Aldridge v. A.T.
Cross Corp., 284 F.3d 72, 82–83 (1st Cir. 2002). Incredibly, as recently as 1994, the Second Circuit
scoffed at the possibility of such a short-term point of view developing into a motive for fraud: “It
is hard to see what benefits accrue from a short respite from an inevitable day of reckoning.”
Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 1130 (2d Cir. 1994).
178. It is well settled that mere puffery does not constitute fraud. See, e.g., In re Burlington
Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1427 (3d Cir. 1997) (finding that “a general, non-specific
statement of optimism or hope that a trend will continue” was vague and therefore immaterial and
non-actionable).
179. In fact, in one Seventh Circuit decision that found scienter allegations against a corporate
defendant sufficient, the court noted the following about one questionable business practice: “While
there may be legitimate reasons for attempting to achieve sales earlier via channel stuffing,
providing excess supply to distributors in order to create a misleading impression in the market of
the company’s financial health is not one of them.” Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs, Inc.,
437 F.3d 588, 598 (7th Cir. 2006), vacated, 127 S. Ct. 2499 (2007).
180. Michael Lewis, In Defense of the Boom, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Oct. 27, 2002, at 44, 94.
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Unlike the bull-run that led to the 1929 Crash181 or even the “Go-Go” days
of the 1960s,182 the gimmick that distinguished the bubble that lasted from
the late 1990s to the early years of the new millennium was what one
writer has dubbed “the cult of the number.”183 The “number” is quarterly
earnings per share, a figure that some find far too easy to manipulate.184
Confirming this cynical conclusion, a study by the General Accounting
Office in 2002 reflected that while the number of earnings restatements in
all of 1997 was 92, by 2001 the number had swelled to 225, with another
125 restatements in the first half of 2002.185 Moreover, in that same period,
the average size of the companies restating their earnings
quadrupled—from companies with a market capitalization of $500 million
to firms ostensibly worth $2 billion.186 Clearly securities issuers’ keenness
to meet Wall Street’s expectations—and the inevitable tie to quarterly
earnings announcements—was palpably strong in that era. Unfortunately,
this type of “short-termism” continues to be a serious concern.187

Lewis labeled the bubble market of the late 1990s “expected” and cynically posited that “[a] boom
without crooks is like a dog without fleas. It doesn’t happen.” Id.
181. See Stock Market Crash of 1929, Britannica Online Encyclopedia,
http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-9069750/stock-market-crash-of-1929 (last visited Feb. 18,
2008).
182. See JOHN BROOKS, THE GO-GO YEARS: THE DRAMA AND CRASHING FINALE OF WALL
STREET’S BULLISH 60S, at 127–49 (John Wiley & Sons 1999) (1973).
183. ALEX BERENSON, THE NUMBER: HOW THE DRIVE FOR QUARTERLY EARNINGS CORRUPTED
WALL STREET AND CORPORATE AMERICA 219–25 (2003) (arguing that a ruthless and relentless
drive to display positive corporate earnings in the years 1997 to 2001 corrupted both Wall Street
and Corporate America); see also John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The
Challenge of Fashioning Relevant Reforms, 84 B.U. L. REV. 301, 315 (2004) (stating that one
reason for companies restating financials between 1997 and 2002 was an “attempt[] by
management to prematurely recognize income”).
184. BERENSON, supra note 183, at xv–xix (arguing that earnings per share is an
approximation that is likely based on accrual accounting, making “the number” easy to manipulate).
See generally ARTHUR LEVITT, TAKE ON THE STREET: WHAT WALL STREET AND CORPORATE
AMERICA DON’T WANT YOU TO KNOW (2002) (exposing conflicts of interest and self-dealing
practices in Corporate America and on Wall Street, and discussing “the true story behind the
numbers”).
185. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FINANCIAL STATEMENT RESTATEMENTS: TRENDS,
MARKET IMPACTS, REGULATORY RESPONSES, AND REMAINING CHALLENGES 15 (2002), available
at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03138.pdf.
186. Id. at 17.
187. A July 2006 report of the Business Roundtable’s Institute for Corporate Ethics and the
CFA Institute’s Centre for Financial Market Integrity defines short-termism as “the excessive focus
of some corporate leaders, investors, and analysts on short-term, quarterly earnings and a lack of
attention to the strategy, fundamentals, and conventional approaches to long-term value creation”
and recommends that Corporate America refocus on “long-term value.” DEAN KREHMEYER ET AL.,
CFA I N S T ., B R E AKIN G T HE S HO R T -T E R M C Y C LE 3–4 (2006), available at
http://www.cfapubs.org/doi/pdf/10.2469/ccb.v2006.n1.4194; see also Harris Collingwood, The
Earnings Game: Everyone Plays, Nobody Wins, HARV. BUS. REV., June 2001, at 65, 65 (“There’s
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Former SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt and others have catalogued some
of the popular revenue recognition tricks and aggressive accounting
methods that corporations use to “beat the estimate,” including such
practices as “channel stuffing,” “big bath” restructuring charges, creative
acquisition accounting a.k.a. “merger magic,” “cookie jar reserves,” other
less common methods of “earnings management,”188 and outright fraud.189
In fact, many of the § 10(b) suits filed in the last ten years have sought
retribution for what former Chairman Levitt expressly denominated a
“Numbers Game” in his oft-quoted 1998 remarks that were aptly so titled:
Increasingly, I have become concerned that the motivation
to meet Wall Street earnings expectations may be overriding
common sense business practices. Too many corporate
managers, auditors, and analysts are participants in a game of
nods and winks. In the zeal to satisfy consensus earnings
estimates and project a smooth earnings path, wishful
thinking may be winning the day over faithful representation.
As a result, I fear that we are witnessing an erosion in the
quality of earnings, and therefore, the quality of financial
reporting. Managing may be giving way to manipulation;
Integrity may be losing out to illusion.190
In fact, some of the judicial opinions that consider a corporation’s
improper revenue recognition practices or failure to timely make necessary
writeoffs or writedowns do find such allegations to be sufficient to meet
the scienter pleading requirement. But rather than seeing this conduct as
indicative of motive, these opinions tend to conclude that this conduct, if
particularly alleged, represents intentionally fraudulent conduct that a
priori establishes scienter. For example, in Novak v. Kasaks,191 the Second
Circuit addressed allegations that the defendants issued financial
statements that overstated the corporation’s financial condition by
“accounting for inventory that they knew to be obsolete and nearly
worthless at inflated values and by deliberately failing to adhere to the

a tyrant terrorizing nearly every public company in the United States—it’s called the quarterly
earnings report. It dominates and distorts the decisions of executives, analysts, investors, and
auditors. Yet it says almost nothing about a business’s health.”); Joe Nocera, A Defense of ShortTermism, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2006, at C1 (describing quarterly earnings as an obsession).
188. See Arthur Levitt, Chairman, SEC, Remarks at the NYU Center for Law and Business:
The “Numbers Game” (Sept. 28, 1998), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speech
archive/1998/spch220.txt; see also BERENSON, supra note 183, at 208–10.
189. For a number of other suspect practices ranging from merely unethical to probably illegal,
see Jerry Useem, New Ethics . . . or No Ethics?, FORTUNE, Mar. 20, 2000, at 82.
190. Levitt, supra note 188.
191. 216 F.3d 300 (2d Cir. 2000).
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Company’s publicly stated markdown policy.”192 And in the face of
internal calls to write off the obsolete inventory, the “[d]efendants’
response . . . was that AnnTaylor could not ‘afford’ to eliminate or writedown the Box & Hold inventory because doing so would ‘kill’ the
Company’s reported financial results and/or profit margins and damage the
Company on ‘Wall Street.’”193
In that case, the Second Circuit found that the plantiff’s allegations
supported an inference that the defendants had acted with conscious
recklessness.194 The court’s finding was no doubt based at least in part on
the damning internal admission of nefarious motive. Notably, Novak sheds
no light on how a court faced with allegations of these types of Generally
Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) violations should rule absent a
compelling quote from management that the company could not afford to
disclose the truth for fear of being “killed” by the market.
Isolated, immaterial, or ill-timed GAAP violations obviously do not
amount to fraud.195 But Corporate America’s emphasis on “the number”
renders this typical securities fraud fact pattern inherently suspect.
Accounting irregularities ought to be viewed in their unique timing-related
context because this context provides a very powerful motive for a
corporation to commit fraud—the obsessive need to meet the expectations
and desires of capital-market participants. Unfortunately, in cases
involving this fact pattern, another mantra has entered the § 10(b)
jurisprudence: “allegations of GAAP violations or accounting
irregularities, standing alone, are insufficient to state a securities fraud
claim.”196
Rather than rely on this intellectual shortcut for assessing scienter,
courts should heighten their scrutiny of allegations of accounting
shenanigans that smack of systematic gaming of the quarterly financialreporting requirements. Courts that require more than this very powerful,
time-sensitive corporate motive along with a particularized description of

192. Id. at 304.
193. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting amended complaint).
194. Id. at 312. Other courts have reasoned similarly. See, e.g., Plotkin v. IP Axess, Inc., 407
F.3d 690, 699–700 (5th Cir. 2005); In re Cabletron Sys., Inc., 311 F.3d 11, 39 (1st Cir. 2002).
195. See, e.g., PR Diamonds, Inc. v. Chandler, 364 F.3d 671, 685–86 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding
that accounting irregularities were not egregious or pervasive enough to support a finding of
scienter).
196. Novak, 216 F.3d at 309; see also Svezzese v. Duratek, 67 F. App’x 169, 173–74 (4th Cir.
2003) (holding that accounting shenanigans without other evidence of fraudulent intent do not
support an inference of scienter); City of Phila. v. Fleming Cos., 264 F.3d 1245, 1261 (10th Cir.
2001) (reciting that GAAP violations alone do not establish scienter). But cf. Barrie v. IntervoiceBrite, Inc., 397 F.3d 249, 263–64 (5th Cir. 2005) (finding GAAP violations sufficient when
considered together with the bonuses and profits from stock sales enjoyed by the defendants
responsible for the accounting irregularities).
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material GAAP violations misconstrue the strong inference requirement.197
While there is not always fire where there is smoke,198 smoke at the
pleading stage entitles plaintiffs to investigate whether there is fire and, if
the case eventually survives summary judgment, requires a jury to make
the ultimate determination.199
3. Atypicality
Few courts have considered the atypicality of an alleged motive for a
corporation to commit fraud when discussing scienter pleading. In
Rothman v. Gregor,200 the corporate defendant used its stock to acquire
four companies.201 By inferring a concrete motive to keep the company’s
stock price artificially high, the Second Circuit reasoned that “[a]lthough
virtually every company may have the desire to maintain a high bond or
credit rating, . . . not every company has the desire to use its stock to
acquire another company.”202 Courts should seek precisely this type of
distinction. Explicitly, courts should not be swayed to either the facile
proposition that every publicly traded corporation is motivated to make a
profit or the conspicuously capitalist extension of this proposition—the
more profit, the better.
Two other cases, one from the Ninth Circuit and one from the Sixth,
reached the same conclusion as the Second Circuit. Both cases involved
allegations that the corporate defendants needed to keep their stock price
high for particular, atypical reasons. In Howard v. Everex Systems, Inc.,203
the plaintiffs contended that the reason for the fraud was the company’s
need to maintain a net worth of $90 million so as to avoid violating loan
covenants and to fund the subsequent year’s business plan.204 Faced with
this not so run-of-the-mill circumstance, the Ninth Circuit reiterated that

197. See, e.g., In re Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., Sec. Litig., 103 F. App’x 465, 469 (3d Cir.
2004) (finding that “A & P’s desire to manage its earnings in order to meet analyst and market
expectations” was a “general corporate motive” and therefore insufficient to give rise to a strong
inference of scienter).
198. Aldridge v. A.T. Cross Corp., 284 F.3d 72, 85 (1st Cir. 2002) (“Where there is smoke,
there is not always fire.”)
199. Cf. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 127 S. Ct. 2499, 2511–12, 2512 n.7
(2007) (dismissing the Seventh Circuit’s concern that a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of a federal
securities fraud complaint based on a consideration of competing inferences might improperly
usurp the jury’s role).
200. 220 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2000).
201. Id. at 93.
202. Id. Contra Darby v. Century Bus. Servs., Inc., 96 F. App’x 277, 283 (6th Cir. 2004)
(concluding that a motive to inflate the company’s stock price to make corporate acquisitions with
stock more affordable was not enough to indicate scienter).
203. 228 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 2000).
204. Id. at 1060, 1064.
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motive and opportunity alone do not suffice to adequately plead scienter
but allowed this atypical motive to bolster other scienter allegations. This
combination of allegations permitted the court to draw the necessary
strong inference.205 Similarly, PR Diamonds, Inc. v. Chandler206 involved
a company’s somewhat anomalous need to keep its stock price high to
maintain its ability to borrow under the terms of a credit agreement.207 The
Sixth Circuit recognized this “more particularized sort[] of motive
allegation[] [as] more probative of scienter.”208 Although the focus of both
of these courts in analyzing the motive allegations was on the level of
particularity with which the plaintiffs pleaded their facts, assuming the
allegations are particularized, these motives stand out as atypical and
therefore should shape the courts’ scienter determination.
Indeed, the atypicality of a corporation’s motive is a critical factor that
enables courts assessing motive to separate commonplace and acceptable
objectives from improper corporate motives that reflect scienter. Dicta in
the Sixth Circuit’s opinion in City of Monroe Employee Retirement System
v. Bridgestone Corp.209 succinctly set out the rationale for using atypicality
as an indicator of an improper motive. The complaint in Bridgestone
alleged that a tire manufacturing company and its parent corporation
deliberately withheld data revealing a serious product defect so that,
among other possible financial motives, the companies could report huge
profits.210 Somewhat predictably, the defense countered that such avarice
was an “ordinary corporate event” endemic to the corporate world and
therefore not indicative of scienter.211 Sidestepping the motive and
opportunity discussion, the court noted that “[e]ven if a regular occurrence,
[an avaricious motive] is not an event this court sanctions as being
legitimately ordinary.”212 Aside from its ethical component, this somewhat
offhand comment by the Sixth Circuit properly recognizes that some
greed-based motives, although seemingly ordinary due to their
omnipresence, are extraordinary due to their circumstances. Boiling it
down in Bridgestone, the companies’ need for positive public relations and
their engaging in routine conflict management was one thing, but
misrepresentations to consumers and the investing public in the face of an

205. Id. at 1063–64; see also In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 977–79
(9th Cir. 1999) (noting that while motive and opportunity alone are insufficient to show scienter
at the pleading stage, they may still be considered as circumstantial evidence of scienter).
206. 364 F.3d 671 (6th Cir. 2004).
207. Id. at 689–90.
208. Id. at 690.
209. 399 F.3d 651 (6th Cir. 2005).
210. Id. at 684–85.
211. Id. at 685 n.28.
212. Id.
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inevitable products liability debacle was quite another. At the heart of this
distinction is the “atypicality” prong of this Article’s proposed analytical
model.
V. CONCLUSION
Undoubtedly, greed motivates. But greed can either be “good” or be “a
sin directly against one’s neighbor.”213 And, to date, no standard judicial
approach exists for analyzing greed in securities fraud cases. In fact, the
only method for pleading avarice that can produce fraud is the seldom
understood and oft-maligned motive and opportunity test. Unfortunately,
history has witnessed several evolutions of this concept. Careful
examination of the available circuit court cases dealing with scienter in the
§ 10(b) context reveals that the very notion of “motive and opportunity”
has been irreparably tarnished. In too many cases, what was once one
prong of an established two-part scienter analysis turned into a conclusory
“label”214 or “magic words”215 approach to pleading scienter. And even
when courts did not engage in such conclusory reasoning, the
disassembled analytical infrastructure of the inquiry and the plausibility of
the ubiquity mantra convinced some courts to dismiss allegations of greed
without meaningfully delving into the context of the allegations.
There is nothing inherently wrong with a Shields approach to capitalist
conduct, which maintains that “[i]n looking for a sufficient allegation of
motive, we assume that the defendant is acting in his or her informed
economic self-interest.”216 But despite that premise, courts must make a
clear distinction between rational self-interest—whether personal or
corporate—and greed that has created the appearance of success where
none exists. So natural and abundant are economic incentives that they do
not logically or inevitably result in fraud. But neither should the nearuniversal desire for success (or at least survival) automatically exonerate
one who does intend to defraud.
To understand the analytical and philosophical entanglement posed by
greed without stumbling on the historical variants of motive and
opportunity pleading, a practical contextual model is needed. We have not
had to look very far to find this construct because it is one established
213. See supra notes 1–2 and accompanying text.
214. See Helwig v. Vencor, Inc., 251 F.3d 540, 550 (6th Cir. 2001) (“In this wash of
allegations, ‘motive’ and ‘opportunity’ are simply recurring patterns of evidence. We decide cases
on facts, not labels.”).
215. Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 311 (2d Cir. 2002) (“Although litigants and lower courts
need and should not employ or rely on magic words such as ‘motive and opportunity,’ we believe
that our prior case law may be helpful in providing guidance as to how the ‘strong inference’
standard may be met.”).
216. Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 1130 (2d Cir. 1994).
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method of analyzing stock sales for scienter. Greed allegations should be
examined through a contextual lens, taking into account the relative
magnitude, timing, and atypicality of alleged motives to determine
whether these motives are suspicious enough to indicate scienter. Only by
thoughtfully sifting the diverse and highly detailed facts of each securities
fraud case through this rubric can we come to grips with greed and
distinguish the pathological from the normal and the conclusory from the
legally sufficient.
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